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Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation  
Year: 2019 
The United States Air Force officially adopted a military Safety Management System in 
2013 to proactively prevent mishaps before they occurred.  The military Aviation Safety 
Action Program (ASAP) allows front-line operators the ability to utilize identity-free 
processes to report safety concerns without fearing retribution.  Historical statistics show 
an average of 12 ASAP reports a week, or less than one percent of all Air Force Mobility 
flights, were being filed by mobility operators.  Personnel at the Air Mobility Command 
safety center determined fewer concerns than desired were being reported and were 
interested in understanding why operators chose not to report using ASAP. 
It is possible for multiple factors to contribute positively or negatively toward 
why an aircrew member would submit an ASAP report.  A previous study by Steckel 
(2014) identified several reasons why airline pilots might not report safety concerns; 
however, no research exists to determine the same information within the military.  The 
purpose of this dissertation was to determine the extent to which four potential factors 
influenced an operator’s intention to submit safety concerns using the military ASAP.  
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While many factors have the ability to influence an individual’s decision-making, the 
four primary factors of interest for this dissertation included: repercussion, 
inconvenience, significance of event, and program value.  The focus of this study 
involved identifying which factors influenced an operator’s intentions to submit ASAP 
reports by examining six relationship-based hypotheses.   
 The researcher conducted a survey of 376 mobility aircrew members (302 
required) at Scott AFB, IL, to examine responses toward safety reporting.  After 
removing invalid responses, 332 samples were collected, cleaned, and analyzed.  
Confirmatory factor analysis was used to test the measurement model while a 
hypothetical structural model was used to test the six relationships.  
The results indicated the factors program value and significance of event directly 
affect an operator’s intent to submit an ASAP report, and positive correlations were 
reported between the factor program value and the factors inconvenience and 
significance of event.  The data suggests that despite a lack of trust among upper-
management, operators still report significant events even if they fear repercussion, often 
simply omitting personal details.  In addition, the data suggests the inconvenience of the 
program is not enough to dissuade reporting safety concerns; operators primarily submit 
safety concerns based on the magnitude of the event.  
It is suggested for the Air Force to focus their attention on promoting the value of ASAP 
and explaining the importance of reporting all magnitudes of events.  It is believed that 
by encouraging operators to report less-significant events while promoting the success of 
the program, the Air Force will see an increase in ASAP reports.   
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DEDICATION 
In 2015, while flying combat missions to Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria, and northern 
Africa, I had the opportunity to serve with some of the bravest military aviators on this 
planet.  In 2015, a C-130J crashed in Afghanistan, killing 11 crewmembers and 
passengers.  As I piloted the flag-draped coffins in my C-17A back to America, many 
emotions flooded my head including the question, “Could someone have prevented this?”  
In November of 2017, a T-38C from Laughlin AFB, TX, crashed in my back 
yard.  The pilot, Paul “Stuck” Barbour, was not only my squadron-mate, but also my dear 
friend.  I was one of the last individuals to personally see Stuck before he climbed into 
his jet, and I was the last one he talked to on the radio before he died. 
In November of 2018, another T-38C crashed at Laughlin AFB, TX.  I performed 
the initial investigation, searched the wreckage for hours, and was there to help John 
“Trojan” Graziano into the hearse.  
As I continuously write this dissertation, the number of USAF Class A military 
mishaps continues to rise.  This research is dedicated to all the brave aviators who have 
lost their lives serving their country.  I sincerely hope the findings of this research go on 
to save lives and help promote safety in aviation worldwide.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The U.S. Air Force officially adopted the Air Force Safety Management System 
(AFSMS) in 2013 (AFI 91-202, 2016; Ostrowski, Valha, & Ostrowki, 2014), yet Air 
Force accident rates failed to decline.  In 2015, a C-130J crashed in Afghanistan, killing 
11 crewmembers (Air Force News Service, 2015); an F-16 experienced a midair 
collision; and an additional F-16 crashed in Europe (NTSB, 2015; U.S. Air Forces in 
Europe and Air Forces Africa, 2016).  In 2016, the crashes continued: four F-16s crashed, 
including an Air Force Thunderbird; two helicopters were destroyed in ground crashes; a 
B-52 Bomber was destroyed; and a U-2 spy plane crashed (56 FW Public Affairs; Beale 
Air Force Base Public Affairs, 2016; Gordon & Horton, 2016; HQ Pacific Air Forces 
Public Affairs, 2016; Staff-ACC, 2016).  
The amount of high-visibility crashes demonstrated an increase in Class-A 
mishaps despite the active use of safety programs.  The USAF defines a Class-A mishap 
as a direct mishap cost totaling more than $2M; a fatality or permanent total disability; 
destruction of a DoD aircraft; or permanent loss of primary mission capability of an AF 
space vehicle (AFI91-204, 2018).  Up to 2019, Air Force safety programs utilized tools 
from the Air Force Safety Center and other safety divisions, including the Operations 
Risk Assessment and Management System (OpsRAMS).  OpsRAMS oversaw multiple 
proactive safety programs, including the Military Aviation Safety Action Program 
(MASAP/ASAP), the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), and the Military Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) data acquisition and analysis (AFI 91-202, 
2016).  
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Some programs saw immediate success: in 2012 Air Mobility Command (AMC) 
was able to determine an unsafe procedure at Grand County airfield in Moses Lake, 
Washington, with the use of MFOQA.  The typical climb-out instructions at Grant 
County forced large, C-17A aircraft to turn dangerously early while still low to the 
ground.  Figure 1 shows the typical climb-out flight path for a C-17A at Grant County 
International.  Through the data acquisition process (MFOQA), personnel at OpsRAMS 
were able to change the procedure to mitigate the discovered hazard (Clark, 2014).  
 
 
Figure 1.  Restricted climb at Moses Lake.  MFOQA data illustrated a dangerous 
procedure for C-17 aircraft as shown by the red track (Permission granted from Clark, 
2014).  
 
MFOQA was not the only proactive program to show initial success; the LOSA 
operation successfully identified pilot trends otherwise unable to be discovered.  In one 
particular LOSA report, OpsRAMS discovered overall safety trends of an entire 
community, including checklist discipline and oceanic procedures (Grosz, 2016).  
Following the discoveries, AMC instituted specific training and special interest items to 
mitigate the discovered hazards.  Unfortunately, LOSA and MFOQA take significant 
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amounts of time and resources to discover safety-related problems.  In comparison, 
ASAP generates immediate data-points from operators experiencing safety-related 
concerns.  
Because all ASAP reports are addressed by Safety offices at the Major Command 
level, reports often trigger quick fixes to safety concerns.  In a 2014 ASAP report, a set of 
taxiway lines in Turkey were reported by aircrews to appear insufficiently close to 
barriers.  The lines forced large aircraft to be closer than desired to ground objects 
rendering a potentially unsafe situation.  After review, the taxiway lines were discovered 
to have been originally measured incorrectly, requiring an immediate new paint job to 
mitigate potential future mishaps (Grosz, 2016).  
OpsRAMS has experienced considerable benefits from their three proactive safety 
programs.  However, ASAP was the only program that examined real-time concerns and 
elevated them to higher-authorities directly from the operators.  While LOSA and 
MFOQA were managed and completed by safety personnel, the success of ASAP relied 
on the submission of voluntary reports from aircrews—information OpsRAMS would 
likely not discover otherwise.  Personnel from AMC Safety and OpsRAMS were worried 
under-reporting of safety concerns existed for multiple reasons (T. Grosz, personal 
communication, 15 September 2016).  
In a preliminary safety study conducted by AMC headquarters in 2016, the 
personnel in OpsRAMS discovered under-reporting exists, especially within ASAP (T. 
Grosz, personal communication, 17 October 2016).  Due to fear of retribution, 
inconvenience of submission, and other factors, responses from a preliminary AMC 
safety survey suggested multiple reasons could lead to mobility aircrews not submitting 
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safety reports.  ASAP was developed as a USAF-sanctioned reporting system designed to 
eliminate fear of reprisal while gathering safety information (AFI-91-225, 2015; Grosz, 
2014).  However, based on previous ASAP tracking, personnel at OpsRAMS were 
receiving less than two ASAP reports per day (OpsRAMS, 2016).  The forecasted target 
number desired was 300 reports per month, or roughly 10 reports per day (T. Grosz, 
personal communication, 9 July 2017).  Personnel at OpsRAMS had interest in seeing 
100% contact information provided when the reports were submitted (T. Grosz, personal 
communication, 9 July 2017).  Due to fear of retribution, inconvenience of submission, 
and other factors, the preliminary AMC safety survey suggested multiple reasons could 
lead to mobility aircrews not submitting safety reports.  
Statement of the Problem 
The U.S. Air Force successfully implemented a military SMS with a high 
emphasis on proactive safety (AFI 91-202, 2016).  The ASAP, LOSA, and MFOQA 
programs proactively attempt to prevent accidents before they potentially occur (AFI 91-
225, 2015).  However, the success of aviation safety, including OpsRAMS programs, 
rests in a positive safety culture through all levels of management, including general 
officers, flying commanders, and pilots (Dekker, 2012).  ASAP was the only program 
that relied on direct and voluntary communication straight from the operators (AFI 91-
225, 2015).  ASAP reports provide up-to-date feedback about safety-related problems to 
top-level leadership (AFI 91-225, 2015).  With over 300 AMC sorties being flown a day, 
an average rate of approximately 12 safety reports a week indicated less than one percent 
of all AMC flights were associated with reported safety concerns.  Personnel at 
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OpsRAMS  were interested in understanding why operators chose not to report safety 
concerns.  
Purpose Statement 
OpsRAMS programs demonstrated some success with their three safety 
programs; however, safety can always evolve and improve.  Using ASAP, OpsRAMS 
received fewer aircrew reports than desired, with their target goal closer to the rates of the 
major US airlines.  It was possible for multiple factors to contribute either positively or 
negatively toward why aircrew members chose to submit an ASAP report or not. 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine if four potential factors affected 
an operator’s intent to submit an ASAP report.  The four factors of the study were 
repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value.  The 
researcher utilized a survey to extract answers from operators regarding their personal 
influences to submitting safety concerns using ASAP.  With valid data, the researcher 
could provide realistic answers to OpsRAMS regarding relationships between the factors 
and why operators may not be submitting safety reports.  
Significance of the Study 
In 2014, Steckel published a dissertation regarding the perceptions toward ASAP 
in the commercial airline industry.  His literature review discussed how “pilots have 
always been wary of reporting their errors or the errors of others in order to improve 
safety” (2014, p. 1).  According to Mr. Tim Grosz, head of OpsRAMS, the AMC safety 
department desired more ASAP reports from all AMC aircrews (T. Grosz, personal 
communication, 9 July 2017).  After determining how each factor affected operator’s 
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decisions to report safety concerns, OpsRAMS could better target how to advertise their 
program to theoretically increase reporting.    
The practical contributions to this study could yield a higher ASAP rate, which 
could subsequently potentially lower accident rates.  Numerous levels in an organization 
benefit from an increase in safety reports.  At the bottom level, operators who 
continuously report concerns have demonstrated buy-in of the program and are assumed 
to have a basic level of trust with the organization.  Through demonstrated actions, 
operators who see their concerns being addressed are likely to continue to report safety 
concerns.  At the top-levels of safety, additional reports most-likely bring otherwise 
unknown hazards to light.  The ability to collect otherwise unknown parts of knowledge 
and be able to act upon discovered hazards is the entire purpose of such a program.  In 
addition, top levels of management will hopefully see true benefits through the reduction 
of aviation mishaps leading to cost savings, increase in operational efficiency, and of 
course, the reduction in loss of life.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
In order to provide tailored hypotheses, specific research questions were developed 
based on the problem statements and purpose.  
 Research Question 1: Which of the four identified factors influence operator’s 
intentions on submitting ASAP reports?  
 Research Question 2: How do the four identified factors affect operator’s 
intentions on submitting ASAP reports? 
 
7 
 
 
The hypotheses were developed based on literature review and discussions with 
OpsRAMS. 
 H1: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators submitting ASAP 
reports. 
 H2: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports. 
 H3: The significance of an event is positively related to operators submitting 
ASAP reports. 
 H4: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to operators 
submitting ASAP reports. 
 H5: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to 
significance of event. 
 H6. The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to 
inconvenience.  
Delimitations 
This dissertation presented the analyzation of AMC operators’ intentions about 
their use of ASAP using surveys to gather data at advanced training courses.  From Jan 
1st through July 31st, 2016, there were 383 ASAP reports filed through AMC.  Of those 
reports, 48 were filed by non-pilot personnel (OpsRAMS Newsletter, 2016).  These 
submissions demonstrated non-pilot aircrew positions were submitting ASAP reports and 
contributing to preventative safety.  The study was aimed to include loadmasters, 
engineers, navigators, and maintenance personnel taking part in the formal training 
course, in addition to the majority of the population, pilots.  While multiple operator 
types attended the training and provided valuable information, it is unknown if the 
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proportion of non-pilots to pilots who participated in the survey was representative of the 
actual AMC population.  
Due to national security reasons, the Department of Defense (DoD) tightly 
controls all official surveys.  Any official survey being presented to any part of the DoD 
must attain Pentagon approval and can take over a year for the process to 
complete.  Regulations prohibit individuals or organizations from simply sending survey 
links to an entire squadron, base, or Major Command.  Due to information-confidentiality 
laws, it is not permissible for organizations to use official, government-contact 
information to solicit information.  Researchers can keep the sample local if it pertains to 
a particular formal training course.  This research relied on a convenience sampling 
technique that surveyed all AMC operators enrolled in advanced training at AMC 
headquarters, Scott AFB, IL.  The course ran approximately once every five weeks, 
instructing approximately 20-40 candidates from all AMC airframes and locations.  It 
was the desire of OpsRAMS to specifically sample just the training population as a 
means to evaluate if safety considerations were being instructed and/or discussed out in 
the mobility environment.  
The significance of an event may be linked to whether an individual feels a safety 
report is warranted or not.  It may be difficult to ultimately quantify an event’s 
significance, due to the fact that multiple operators may think of the same event in 
different ways; while one operator may feel the event is insignificant, another may feel 
the same incident is worthy of being reported.   
This research specifically examined four major factors and two additional 
relationships among those factors.  There are an unknown number of additional factors 
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that could influence an operators’ decision to report safety concerns; however, this study 
only focused on what was considered the four major factors.  
Limitations and Assumptions 
Not all AMC operators had the opportunity to participate in the survey due to the 
desire of OpsRAMS to specifically survey only those participating in advanced training.  
However, the assumption accepted by both the researcher and OpsRAMS was the data 
collected from the convenience sample was representative of a majority of the Active 
Duty AMC population.  Of the Active Duty bases, 100% of the bases were represented, 
and all mobility airframes were represented within a reasonable percentage.  The 
National Guard and Reserve bases were not adequately represented—this is most likely 
due to the general non-continuous training Reserve and Guard pilots send their upgrading 
pilots to.  The data will most likely be most accurate toward Active Duty pilots and may 
not represent the Guard or Reserves.  Air Mobility Command provided unclassified pilot 
distribution percentages.  There were only small differences between Active Duty major 
airframes and were not considered significant for this study.  However, the National 
Guard and Reserves saw a significant lack of representation for this study in the C-130 
and KC-135 communities for unknown reasons.  
It is assumed that the individuals participating in the survey have been flying with 
a more experienced corps of aviators—the operators attending the AMC training had 
been working closely with instructors and evaluators for over two years, and thus have at 
least heard and considered the opinions, policies, and procedures of those who have been 
instructing the upgrading population.  However, this specific sample group could affect 
the results due to the nature of taking essentially the “average” pilot.  By selecting this 
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group of aviators, the researcher made strong assumptions that the teachings of 
experienced aviators were passed to the younger, upgrading pilots, who had been flying 
in the mobility world for more than two years.  Even though these operators may not 
have 10+ years of experience, it is assumed the instruction of how to use ASAP and why 
to use the system was passed on.  The results are generalized and cannot truly speak to 
the opinions of the entire command.  
In regard to the structural model, it is assumed the specification of the model 
relied on the researcher’s good judgement; wherein, the researcher 1) avoided the 
omission of correlated causes; 2) correctly partitioned the variables; 3) accurately laid out 
direct and indirect effects; and 4) properly conveyed the error covariance structure 
(Kline, 2015).  
There are four main influencing variables this study targeted for research.  While 
there are multiple additional reasons for which an individual may or may not submit an 
ASAP report, this study assumed those additional factors were not as influential on the 
entire population as the four being presented for study.  Fear of reprisal is a large part of 
under-reporting (Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein, 1999).  Frazier (2013) 
believes operators fear retribution not only to themselves, but to their fellow employees 
for supplying information to management.  Inconvenience can also affect reporting 
rates—it was hypothesized by Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui that the inconvenience of 
completing the safety report itself contributes to a lack of safety reporting (2015).  When 
operators are unable to immediately report due to task prioritization, long wait times, or 
even simple memory-loss over time, the likelihood of a report being filed diminishes 
(Gilbey et al., 2015).  Higher reporting can be associated with a positive perceived value.  
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In a study by Griffin and Neal, perceptions of knowledge about safety directly influenced 
safety participation (2000).  Those who positively identify perceived value in a safety 
system positively contribute to reporting (Freiwald, 2013).  In addition, the magnitude of 
an event will contribute to safety reporting.  Gilbey et al. (2015) suggested if operators 
feel the event was small or harmless, the event is not worth reporting.  These four factors 
were considered the most prevalent reasons for influencing reporting; however, it was 
acknowledged that other factors could contribute, albeit not in a major capacity.  
The data was complete and continuous, with no outliers or missing inputs 
(Schumacker & Lomax, 2010).  In regard to survey participants, it was assumed all 
individuals were competent, of sound nature, could read and write, were familiar with the 
terms being presented, and provided honest, accurate answers.  The researcher assumed 
the individuals sufficiently completed all required safety training as provided by specific 
aircraft syllabi to include ASAP and the reporting process.  The researcher assumed all 
operators operate with a safety-mindset, and do not wish ill-regard on the operation.  For 
the purposes of this study, the safety mindset of an individual is that he or she simply 
desires to communicate hazardous information, if discovered.  
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Definitions of Terms 
Culture   
 
 
A sociological view of the shared stock of 
knowledge, values, and symbols in a social entity 
(Pfaff, Hammer, Ernstmann, Kowalski, & Ommen, 
2009). 
Just culture    
 
 
 
 
An environment where front-line operators are not 
punished for actions, omissions, or decisions made 
commensurate with experience and training, and 
where gross negligence, willful disregard, and 
destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber, 2015).
Proactive safety An attempt to prevent accidents and incidents 
before they occur (Welborn & Boraiko, 2009).  
Q-1  
 
 
 
 
The aircrew member demonstrated desired 
performance and knowledge of procedures, 
equipment, and directives within tolerances 
specified in the grading criteria (AFI11-202V2, 
2010). 
           Q-2    
 
 
 
 
 
The aircrew member demonstrated the ability to 
perform duties safely, but there were one or more 
area(s)/sub-area(s) where additional training was 
assigned or a non-critical area/subarea grade of U 
(unsatisfactory) was awarded (AFI11-202V2, 
2010). 
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Q-3  
 
 
The aircrew member demonstrated an unacceptable 
level of safety, performance, or knowledge (AFI11-
202V2, 2010). 
Safety culture   
 
 
The attitude, beliefs, perceptions, and values that 
employees share in relation to safety in the 
workplace (DeMaria, 2017).  
List of Acronyms 
AC Advisory Circular 
AFI Air Force Instruction  
AFSMS Air Force Safety Management System 
AIB Accident Investigation Board 
AMC Air Mobility Command 
ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 
ASRS Aviation Safety Reporting System 
AVE Average Variance Estimated  
CFA Confirmatory Factor Analysis  
CFR Code of Federal Regulations  
DoD Department of Defense 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FMEA Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
FOQA Flight Operations Quality Analysis  
GFI Goodness of Fit Index 
GOF Goodness of Fit 
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GRACC          Global Reach Aircraft Commander’s Course 
ICAO International Civil Aeronautical Organization  
LOSA Line Observation Safety Audit 
MFOQA          Military Flight Operations Quality Analysis 
NTSB National Transportation and Safety Board 
NZCAA New Zealand Civil Aviation Administration  
OpsRAMS Operations Risk Assessment and Management System 
ORM Operational Risk Management 
OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
RMSEA Root Mean Square Error of Approximation  
SEM Structural Equation Modeling  
SIB Safety Investigation Board 
SMS Safety Management System 
Summary 
The U.S Air Force successfully implemented a safety management system and 
utilized three key, proactive programs: ASAP, LOSA, and MFOQA.  Each of the 
programs demonstrated positive safety improvements across Air Mobility Command; 
however, the personnel at OpsRAMS believed safety reports were being under-reported.  
The ASAP program only received roughly two reports a day, with target goals closer to 
10—numbers that would more closely match the U.S. airline’s civilian ASAP submission 
rate.  OpsRAMS personnel desired to know if the potential key factors: repercussion, 
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inconvenience, significance of an event, and program value affected an individual’s 
decision to report a safety concern.  
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CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE 
The review of relevant literature in this chapter outlines the trends of safety 
culture throughout aviation and culminates with the positive correlation between a 
positive safety culture and voluntary reporting.  Safety programs were often a relatively 
reactive process, therein waiting for safety concerns to arise before making necessary 
adjustments (Brady, 2000).  In 1908, Orville Wright crashed an aircraft in Virginia, and 
the first safety report was created.  The investigating personnel reactively explained why 
Orville thought the aircraft crashed and created potential remedies for the situation 
(Brady, 2000).  The U.S. government recognized an increase in hazards existed with 
increased air traffic in the 1950s, and utilized preventative safety with the creation of 
federal airways and air traffic procedures (Brady, 2000).  In the 1970s, the FAA began 
the ASAP program as a truly preventative program (FAA, 2017).  Today, safety reporting 
is a prime example of preventative safety and how organizations can gather safety 
information to help prevent an accident before an occurrence (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 
2008).  
Safety Culture Evolution 
Safety culture is prevalent in multiple industries and is shared among 
organizations.  As an example, “many safety initiatives have been transferred 
successfully from commercial aviation to health care” (Lewis, 2011, p. 4).  One initiative 
used by multiple industries is incentivized reporting; with no-fault reporting, by 
submitting safety information to the FAA, pilots have proof of a constructive safety 
attitude (Lewis, 2011).  Despite variations between definitions and measurement scales, 
17 
 
 
commonality exists “allowing identification of core conceptual themes and shared 
measurement subscales” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).  “It is due to such convergence that 
recent meta-analytic studies revealed that safety climate offers robust prediction of 
objective and subjective safety criteria across industry and countries” (Zohar, 2010, p. 
1517).  “These studies attest to the strength of relationship between safety climate and 
safety criteria” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).  One such safety model is the safety pyramid; it is 
designed to identify latent factors that increase the likelihood of incidents/accidents 
through the advertisement of unsafe working conditions.  According to Zohar (2010), the 
meta-analytic data suggests safety climate perceptions predict safety behaviors; the 
arrows on the safety pyramid suggest potential effects of safety climate on 
accident/incident factors.  
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Figure 2.  Integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models (Zohar, 2010).  
Printed with permission from Elsevier.   
 
This is the integration of safety climate and safety pyramid models.  Given the 
availability of well-developed procedures for safety climate measurement, the analysis of 
latent pathogens allows comparison between departments of an organization and between 
organizations of the same industry.  
Benefits of Management of Culture 
Controlling or managing a culture can help an organization move toward a 
particular mindset.  In a study conducted by Hajmohammad and Vachon:  
Results suggested that organizations with a positive [safety culture], where 
(i) top management is concerned about employees’ safety and well-being 
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and (ii) employees are empowered and actively involve and participate in 
safety-related activities, are more likely to gain better financial, 
environmental, and safety outcomes as a result of their increased 
employees’ commitment in pursuing organization goals and objectives.  
(2014, p. 273) 
They further expand, suggesting that commitment to “safety and 
establishing a positive [safety culture] as the starting point toward achieving a 
sustainable business can yield great benefits not only in terms of improved safety 
performance, but also with regards to improvements in a firm’s environmental 
and financial outcomes” (Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014, p. 274).  By 2006, 
safety culture was also shown to affect organizational commitment, job 
satisfaction, and intentions to stay at the current organization (Clark, 2006). 
In a meta-analysis study, Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke suggest that both 
the person and the situation are important factors related to workplace safety; “Workers 
can be selected, trained, and supported through positive safety climate to maximize safety 
motivation and safety knowledge, which in turn leads to safe behaviors and fewer 
accidents and injuries” (2009, p. 1273).  Understanding the culture and climate of an 
organization is important in order to make a positive change.  It is important for 
organizations to recognize they can benefit from creating a stronger safety culture and a 
more accurate reporting climate (Probst, 2008).  One snapshot of a culture, often 
considered climate, can be found using surveys.  
Surveys of employees have generated many possible explanations for 
underreporting, including demographic characteristics, such as age and organizational 
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tenure; perceived lack of management responsiveness; fear of reprisals or loss of 
workplace perks and pay incentives; and an acceptance that injuries are a fact of life in 
certain lines of work (Probst, 2008).  Probst (2008) confirmed two hypotheses: that 
organizational safety climate is related to the rate of experienced employee injuries, such 
that a more positive climate is related to a lower injury rate; and that organizations with a 
poor safety climate underreport injuries to a greater extent than organizations with a 
positive safety climate.  Probst (2008) discovered the existence of underreporting itself 
was not a new finding necessarily, but that certain organizations with a poor safety 
climate might be more likely than others to experience underreporting.  
Safety culture as a method to influence the reduction of risk and prevention 
of accidents.  Zohar (2010) specifically argues a strong safety climate leads to an 
increase in safety performance, thus reducing the amount of accidents.  One indication of 
the prevention of accidents is the safety performance of an organization (Zohar, 2010).  
Stolzer, Halford, and Goglia (2008) argue one of the primary steps in establishing a 
safety culture is to assess the current culture.  When considering management as part of 
culture, Coyle, Sleeman, and Adams argue the measurement of “precursors of accidents 
identified in a safety climate analysis provides a powerful proactive management tool” 
(Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995, p. 247).  Note: safety performance may be used to 
refer to two different concepts: an organizational metric for safety outcomes, such as 
number of injuries per year; or a metric for safety-related behaviors of 
individuals (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009).  
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Culture and Climate with Respect to Accidents 
Safety climate refers to employees’ perceptions of the degree to which 
management rewards, supports, and expects safe practices.  Organizations that have a 
positive safety climate experience fewer accidents and injuries than those with a negative 
safety climate (Allen, Barren, & Scott, 2010).  
It is argued “safety knowledge and safety motivation were most strongly related 
to safety performance behaviors, closely followed by psychological safety climate and 
group safety climate.  With regard to accidents and injuries, however, group safety 
climate had the strongest association” (Christian, Bradley, Wallace, & Burke, 2009, p. 
1103).  Christian, Bradley, Wallace, and Burke analyzed Clarke’s 2006 meta-analysis 
where “safety climate is a meaningful predictor of safety performance behaviors 
(particularly safety participation) and is weakly related to accidents” (2009, p. 1103). 
Another crucial aspect regarding the development of safety climate is the 
correction of organizational errors through error reporting.  Employees may perceive 
reporting errors (or unsafe conditions, for example) as risky, which may increase their 
reluctance to report (Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  Probst (2008) found that organizations with 
a more positive safety climate appear to have less underreporting of errors (Allen, Barren, 
& Scott, 2010). 
Climate Vs. Culture 
A key difference exists between climate and culture.  Safety culture is a product 
of individual and group values, attitudes, perceptions, competencies, and patterns of 
behavior that determine the commitment to, and the style and proficiency of an 
organization’s health and safety management (Sexton et al., 2006).  Climate, however, is 
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“a summary of molar perceptions that employees share about their work environments … 
a frame of reference for guiding appropriate and adaptive task behaviors” (Zohar, 1980, 
p. 96), and is considered a subset of organizational climate (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 
1995). 
In another explanation, “organizational climate is made up of shared perceptions 
among employees concerning the procedures, practices and kinds of behaviors that get 
rewarded and supported with regard to a specific strategic focus” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).  
One of the key attributes for organizational climate is the analyzation of employee 
perceptions of certain aspects of their organizational environment (Zohar, 2010).  
Employee surveys are designed to discover what behaviors get supported and rewarded 
and ought to relate to the nature of relationships between rather than isolation of policies, 
procedures, and practices (Zohar, 2010).  
 Predictive Nature to Measure Climate / Culture. “For safety climate to be 
assessed and improved it must first be measured – a methodological approach which is 
well established in high-risk industries such as aviation, the nuclear energy and petro-
chemical sectors” (de Wet, Johnson, Mash, & McConnachie, 2010, p. 135).  Clarke 
(2006) argues the influence of safety climate actually varies across occupational settings.  
Regardless, safety climate assessment typically requires the workforce to complete 
questionnaires anonymously on a periodic basis (de Wet et al., 2010).  “When the 
strategic focus involves performance of high-risk operations, the resultant shared 
perceptions define safety climate” (Zohar, 2010, p. 1517).  Safety climate perceptions 
should focus on the nature of relationships between safety policies, procedures, and 
practices (Zohar, 2010).  Christian et al. (2009) break down safety climate into 
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psychological (individual) safety and group safety climate.  When individual perceptions 
are shared, a group-level climate emerges.  
Zohar’s 1980 study suggested safety climate appeared to be directly related to the 
safety record of an organization and argued the perceived climate of an organization will 
identify areas for improvement (Coyle, Sleeman, & Adams, 1995).  “Organizational 
climate, when operationalized and validated, may be a useful tool in understanding 
occupational behavior” (Zohar, 1980, p. 96).  The two biggest factors in determining the 
level of safety climate were worker’s perceptions of management attitudes about safety 
and the perceptions about the relevance of safety in general processes (Zohar, 1980).  
Culture in Society 
The idea of an established and measured culture was analyzed in a current context 
when Raymond Williams referred to culture in 1977 as “a general process of inner 
development” (Grossberg, 2013, p. 457).  Today, the meaning and definition of culture 
varies wildly between industries and organizations.  Many consider safety culture a sub-
facet of organizational culture, a concept used to describe shared values that affect and 
influence member’s attitudes and behaviors compared to the organization’s health 
(Cooper, 2000).  The definition of culture is admittedly broad by the Bloomsbury 
Dictionary of English Literature (1997) but is best used in safety context as: “a 
sociological view of the shared stock of knowledge, values, and symbols in a social 
entity” (Pfaff, Hammer, Ernstmann, Kowalski, & Ommen, 2009, p. 493).  
It is important to note the very concept of culture is not a stable definition; an 
individual may perceive culture, race, and ethnicity all as the same entity (Monk, 
Winslade, & Sinclair, 2008).  In literature, there exists no universal agreement on the 
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definition of the word culture, but for the purposes of this dissertation, culture signifies 
the sum of the patterned behaviors that makes up how an organization interacts with 
society (Monk, Winslade, & Sinclair, 2008).  
If culture is considered a way of life, a community’s culture, therefore, provides 
the position and standard for judging all social change (Grosberg, 2013).  The ability to 
compare and contrast cultural norms slowly forms a difficult problem for those effecting 
change.  Because comparisons of culture can range on a scale from global proportions to 
small entities, it is difficult to mold or adjust a culture without enduring unintended 
pushback (Ojalehto & Medin, 2015).  However, according to Danisman’s research 
regarding culture and organizations, most institutions are hesitant to adopt a change into a 
program (2008).  It is likely that managerial decisions will be difficult to implement, due 
to societal-based patterns of understanding, depending on the current culture of the 
organization (Danisman, 2008).  Johansson, Astrom, Kauffeldt, Helldin, and Carlstrom 
(2014) argue conservative, organizational culture has the potential to hinder the 
implementation of new organizational models.  In their study of nurses overcoming 
culture shift, Johansson et al. (2014) discovered the dominating culture of their ward 
included cohesion, belongingness, and trust, but also included a tendency to avoid 
alternative ideas and perspectives.  Not all individuals, groups, or organizations will 
respond to change in the same manner; beliefs, values, and attitudes can vary 
tremendously (Cooper, 2000).  Even though an organization may possess a dominating 
‘safety culture’, the perception between sites, elements, offices, or divisions could be 
completely different (Cooper, 2000).  Therefore, before an organization attempts to 
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change a specific perception, it is essential to understand the challenges that will be faced 
when attempting to institute a culture change.  
Safety Culture 
Safety culture has been an evolving tool for organizations to improve the overall 
practice of safety in the workplace.  “Safety culture is a sub-facet of organizational 
culture, which is thought to affect members’ attitudes and behavior in relation to an 
organization’s ongoing health and safety performance” (Cooper, 2000, p. 111).  
Industries, including offshore, nuclear, and shipping, have all expressed interest in the 
concept of a safety culture as a means of reducing the potential for mitigating large-scale 
disasters (Cooper, 2000).  Excluding workplace regulations implemented by agencies 
such as the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), proactive safety 
programs can be used to influence safety culture.  While safety culture has been 
historically discussed as a required entity, the real need for a robust safety culture was 
magnified with the Chernobyl catastrophe in 1986 (Solomon, 2015).  The investigation 
into Chernobyl cited a lack of a positive safety culture as a key cause for the disaster, 
highlighting a need for enterprises around the world to reconsider their approach to safety 
(Solomon, 2015).  
Consumers and governments demand accident-free industries, and the 
implementation of a strong safety program helps organizations progress toward a positive 
safety culture (Sammer, Lykens, Singh, Mains, Lacken, & Nuha, 2010).  It is generally 
accepted that a safety culture must be continuously monitored and improved to avoid 
significant incidents (Warszawska & Kraslawski, 2016).  The responsibility of a safety 
culture does not rely on the safety office but must be fully committed to and instituted by 
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the administration (DeLaHunt, 2012).  Aviation is not the only community concerned 
with safety culture; medical, manufacturing, oil, and construction are all examples of 
industries extremely interested in positive safety cultures.  
In a positive safety culture, team members are encouraged to take responsibility 
and bring safety concerns to management’s attention (Solomon, 2016).  On the opposite 
side, a negative culture attempts to blame individuals or even conceal known incidents 
(Solomon, 2016).  One of the greatest tools a management team can utilize to measure 
the health of their safety culture is a safety perception survey (Frazer, 2013).  While there 
are numerous instruments, most surveys include a series of questions or statements 
designed to measure an individual’s perceptions of the safety culture of their organization 
(Cooper, 2000).  Often, the information provided by a survey can help provide insights 
into why individuals may not be submitting safety concerns; surveys can also provide 
valuable information about the perception of safety within the organization (Frazer, 
2013).  
In the chemical industry, safety engineers believe safety cultures “result from the 
actions of each individual making slight adjustments, providing reminders to their peers, 
and by working with colleagues” (Wood-Black, 2004, p. 29).  While formal policy, 
procedures, and audits are all necessary to officially maintain a safety management 
system, the safety culture of an organization is established with buy-in from every level 
of the organization from management to operators (Dekker, 2012). 
Just Culture  
Just culture—as defined in the aviation environment—is a culture where front-
line operators are not punished for actions, omissions, or decisions made commensurate 
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with experience and training, and where gross negligence, willful disregard, and 
destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber, 2015).  A just culture provides an atmosphere 
where employees are encouraged to report their mistakes without fear of retribution from 
an organization’s leadership.  However, a just culture does not allow unacceptable 
behavior to be tolerated.  Because every mistake is different, it is necessary for 
management to draw a line between accepting mistakes and tolerating unacceptable 
behavior (Oliber, 2015).  
A strong safety culture is the culmination of multiple sub-cultures, each with 
independent tasks and overarching requirements (Cooper, 2000).  Cooper (2000) argues a 
just culture is actually the sub-byproduct of a strong reporting culture, where just culture 
is part of the building blocks that make up a reporting culture.  Cooper equates a safety 
culture to the similarities of an informed culture and characterizes the reporting culture as 
a dependent state to the informed culture itself.  Essentially, the base for a strong just 
culture must lie with the strong foundation of an overarching safety culture (Cooper, 
2000).  
The idea of a just culture requires not only a call to the attention of a matter at 
hand; a just culture must provide the ability to both satisfy demands for accountability 
while simultaneously contributing to the learning environment (Dekker & Breakey, 
2016).  However, a balance must exist between wanting all information in the open while 
not tolerating all actions (Dekker, 2014).  In a just culture, it is important to ask: ‘what is 
responsible for things going wrong?’ rather than trying to find a culprit or determine who 
is responsible (Dekker, 2011).  
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Even with a just culture officially enacted, employees may still be hesitant to 
report concerns.  Employees fail to report hazardous situations for multiple reasons.  
Sometimes the employees are unaware of the potential consequences; some fear the 
retribution they or others will receive for their information (Frazer, 2013).  An additional 
reason can be lack of acknowledgement—an employee may be hesitant to provide new 
information if a previous report was submitted without any feedback (note: military 
ASAPs have the option of including personal information for follow-up).  This situation 
leads individuals to believe management does not care about safety.  Other times, 
employees may simply believe the program is ineffective due to scale, managerial 
concerns, budget, or other constraints (Frazer, 2013), thus the program has no value.  
One of the most difficult challenges with implementing a just culture is stepping 
away from the cultural norm where managers seek to find an individual at fault.  Dekker 
(2012) suggests it is human nature to find a scapegoat to shed the blame away from an 
individual and away from the true cause in order to save face of an organization or 
individual.  However, if the blame is shifted away from the true cause, the organization 
can suffer significantly in terms of willingness and desire to report safety incidents on the 
part of employees; employees will not feel protected, will not report their safety 
concerns, and will not keep the lines of communication open.  The direct result is an 
organization that fails to acknowledge potential safety pitfalls within its own walls.  
Dekker (2012) suggests a specific life-cycle exists for a successful safety culture: 
report, disclose, protect, and learn.  Convincing individuals to report are often the 
difference in a successful safety culture and one that is not.  Many professional groups, 
such as fire fighters, police, pilots, technicians, nurses, and air traffic controllers have 
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developed deep-rooted cultures that require members to remain silent when a problem 
arises (Dekker, 2012).  It is common for the members of such groups to stay unified and 
will often refuse to speak, thus protecting the individuals from retribution.  
Unfortunately, safety issues continue to be prevalent when information is not shared, and 
individuals who discover problems find themselves in situations where they either report 
mistakes and risk reprimand or hide the mistake and hope the entire crew remains silent.  
In Dekker’s just culture life cycle, it is imperative for individuals to report safety 
concerns.  The true balance of the system therefore lies within management; what actions 
should the organization take when an employee notifies management of a mistake?  
Management has ultimate responsibility to determine acceptable levels of error 
commensurate with experience and training.  Once employees recognize management has 
an interest in protecting individuals, the organization can move forward with a more 
balanced approach to safety.  
Proactive Vs. Reactive Safety 
Historically, aviation safety was an extremely reactionary process.  In the early 
1900s, aviation was gathering significant attention, often with increased negative public 
perceptions of aircraft incidents and accidents (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  The 
increased awareness led Congress to pass the Air Commerce Act of 1926, authorizing the 
Secretary of Air Commerce to “investigate, record, and make public the cause of 
accidents in civil air navigation” (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p. 43).  As aviation 
advanced, multiple, additional state departments were formed, eventually leading to the 
development of the NTSB in 1966 (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  While accident 
investigations and reporting were critical processes necessary to determine the causes of 
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an incident, they remained reactive procedures performed after the occurrence (Welborn 
& Boraiko, 2009).  
By 1975, the NTSB concluded a new approach to safety was required after the 
crash of TWA 514 (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  Investigators of the crash 
discovered that “pilots were extremely wary of submitting any report that could 
potentially be used against them or their colleagues” (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p. 
46), and began the process of anonymous reporting with a neutral, trusted broker as the 
receiver of information: NASA.  
The ability to quantify a proactive safety program is quite different from reactive 
safety.  It can be difficult to prove a proactive safety system is truly the reason a 
hypothetical accident did not occur, thus making it difficult to say a proactive program 
saved a specific amount of assets or lives.  The proactive procedures in a safety process 
attempt to prevent accidents and incidents before they occur but use inferential analysis 
to describe a potential reality that is not yet manifest (Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008).  
Nevertheless, a truly effective safety process will have both fully functional proactive and 
reactive elements (Welborn & Boraiko, 2009).  
With reactive safety, investigations sometimes focus on time-sensitive evidence—
a specific team gathers and analyzes evidence to determine a root cause. Proactive safety, 
however, often relies on models and programs to ensure success and is used daily by both 
leadership and front-line operators (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008).  On a daily basis, 
operational risk management (ORM) is used to calculate the perceived risk against 
mission requirements.  Elements such as weather, human factors, type of mission, and 
mission requirements all help quantify the potential risk for the flight.  The FAA (AC 
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120-51E) suggests pilots use the IM SAFE acronym prior to flight, reminding pilots to 
check for illness, medications, stress, alcohol, fatigue, and emotional state (2004a).  Both 
the ORM process and IM SAFE test are examples of preventative measures to analyze 
risk.  In addition to daily risk-management tools, many organizations adopt advanced and 
more complicated, preventative safety programs.  Aviation programs such as the Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), and Flight 
Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA) gather trend data directly from the operators to 
examine potential problems.  
When combined, the elements of the proactive and reactive safety process form a 
safety management system (SMS).  SMS is a system designed to prevent accidents 
through an effective management of safety risk (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008).  The 
program is designed to minimize risk based on four safety components:  
1. Safety policy  
2. Safety risk management 
3. Safety assurance 
4. Safety promotion  
The promotion of safety is characterized by the safety values, attitudes, and behaviors of 
the management and front-line operators within the organization (ICAO, 2013).  As 
organizations look to fully implement a working SMS, it is necessary to have all four 
components of the system functioning efficiently.  The safety culture of an organization 
directly contributes to the overall safety performance of an organization and can lead to 
the success or failure of the SMS.  
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Investigative Process  
Despite the progress of proactive safety programs, including SMS, aircraft 
accidents still drive a need to look at safety retrospectively through the results of 
accident/incident investigations.  The investigative process is a formal evaluation 
designed to identify accident causal factors and opportunities for an organization to 
improve its safety management system.  
It is important to understand accidents do not simply happen—they are caused 
(Oakley, 2012).  An investigation is more than simply digging for answers—it is a 
structured process that attempts to identify a full sequence of events to determine causal 
factors (Oakley, 2012).  Investigations are typically considered a reactive process because 
they are initiated after an accident occurs.  However, an investigation can still be 
considered a proactive process, as the practice is not complete until corrective actions or 
recommendations are published (Arnaldo Valdes & Gomez Comendador, 2011).  While 
the ultimate goal is to determine the source of failure, investigators need to determine an 
accident sequence through unbiased evidence-gathering to communicate acquired 
knowledge (Lindberg, Hansson, & Rollenhagen, 2010), even if it means human errors 
were/are the causal factors.  
Despite active safety management plans, public perception of the risk of aircraft 
accidents and crises continues to grow (Roed-Larson & Stoop, 2012).  Accident 
investigations continue to be a reactive measurement of safety management systems, but 
still provide valuable identification of future hazards.  Investigations can often require 
significant resources with finances, personnel, equipment, and more.  However, 
investigations remain a crucial part of any safety organization.  Through the active 
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process of determining root causes and recommendations, the investigative process will 
continue to act as a proactive safety measure.  
AIB / SIB.  After a military aviation accident, two investigations simultaneously 
take place.  One is performed by an accident investigation board (AIB) and the other by a 
safety investigation board (SIB).  According to Air Force Instruction 91-204, Safety 
Investigations and Reports, “safety investigations and reports are conducted and written 
solely to prevent future mishaps” (2014, p. 7).  Accident investigation boards, however, 
“inquire into all the facts and circumstances surrounding mishaps as well as to obtain and 
preserve all available evidence for use in litigation, claims, disciplinary action, adverse 
administrative action, and for public disclosure in accordance with DoD 5400.7R 
Freedom of Information Act” (2014, 7).  Safety investigations take priority over any 
accident investigation board unless criminal activity or suicide is suspected.  
NTSB.  The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigates accidents 
and incidents to determine as expeditiously as possible what caused the accident to 
prevent a similar occurrence.  The NTSB is an independent government federal agency 
charged with improving safety of the United States’ transportation system.  The NTSB 
does not determine fault or liability, and under 49 U.S.C. § 1154(b), the NTSB may not 
allow any evidence gathered to be used in a civil action for damages as mentioned in the 
report (Sumwalt & Dalton, 2016).  
Once the NTSB is notified of an aircraft accident, a Response Operations Center 
dispatches a response team to the site.  The NTSB may grant party status to outside 
agencies who have vested interest in the accident or could provide helpful insight.  With 
party status, the organization is prohibited from using any data or collected evidence in 
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use toward prosecution or litigation.  Ultimately, the role of the NSTB is to collect 
evidence, discover causal factors, and make recommendations to prevent further 
occurrences.  
Proactive Programs  
There are many proactive safety programs in use throughout the aviation industry.  
One of the most familiar tools is the basic operational risk management (ORM) 
assessment designed to evaluate the amount of risk a flight crew may experience based 
on flight composition, environmental factors, and tasks required of the flight.  Other, 
more complicated proactive safety programs are more extensive and require significant 
personnel to analyze the data.  Large and complicated proactive safety programs include 
the Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP), the Line Operations Safety Audit (LOSA), 
and the Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA).  
ASAP is one of the easiest ways for front-line operators to voice safety concerns 
with upper management.  The FAA created ASAP with the goal to enhance aviation 
safety through preventative communication by allowing voluntary reporting of safety 
issues (FAA, 2017).  In order to encourage additional reporting, program designers 
developed incentives.  By the beginning of 2017, 95 air carriers were actively involved 
with the FAA’s ASAP program, with many of the participating airlines additionally 
including their maintenance personnel, flight attendants, and dispatchers (FAA, 2017).  
The U.S. Air Force similarly adopted a military version of ASAP in 2011 and 
constantly promotes the use of the program.  Air Force Instruction (AFI) 91-225 dictates 
the requirements and purposes of ASAP as a program designed for Airmen to report 
information critical to resolving mishaps (2015).  Military members can submit identity 
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protected reports through a DoD-controlled website (asap.safety.af.mil) while general 
aviation pilots can file safety reports through the Aviation Safety Reporting System 
(ASRS) website (asrs.arc.nasa.gov).  Within a majority of major airlines, operators can 
report safety concerns through ASAP if their airline supports the program.  Once filed, 
upper levels of management and safety personnel review the reports for potential safety 
concerns and suggest appropriate proactive actions.  
FOQA is another resource used to examine safety in a proactive way.  The FAA 
enacted FOQA in 2004 with the release of Advisory Circular (AC) 120-82.  The AC 
explains how the program is voluntary but may utilize confidential and proprietary 
information without the fear of reprimand or disclosure.  The program allows commercial 
airlines to share aggregate information with the FAA to address operational risk issues in 
aviation.  According to the FAA, the key element in FOQA is the application of 
corrective actions to assure the unsafe conditions being discovered are effectively 
mitigated (FAA, 2004b).  Information recorded can include stability criteria at specific 
airfields during different times of day or year depending on search parameters.  
AFI 91-225 describes a similar military FOQA process: the analysis and trending 
of aircraft system and flight performance data to enhance combat readiness through 
improvements in operations, maintenance, training, and safety functions (2015).  The AFI 
allows technicians to contact aircrew for the purposes of gathering additional information 
only but does not allow the prosecution of aircrew or maintainers.  With a successful 
FOQA program, the FAA can effectively change and evaluate operational safety, aircraft 
and crew performance, training effectiveness, and more (FAA, 2004b).  
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LOSA is another tool available to proactively address aviation safety (FAA, 
2014).  The Line Operations Safety Assessment allows management to gather key safety 
information through peer observations in the cockpit.  The FAA (2014) maintains LOSA 
is anonymous and voluntary and provides valuable information for data verification and 
safety awareness.  The U.S. Air Force has a similar LOSA program.  AFI 91-225 
emphasizes that LOSAs are not check rides or evaluations—the audits are conducted by 
silent observers who document all operations that influence aircrew (2015).  Significant 
findings from LOSAs can lead to suggested systems changes to operators and 
management.  
Military and Civil Differences in Safety Reporting 
Finding ways to encourage pilots to submit safety information can be a struggle.  
The FAA (through NASA) encourages safety reporting through the promises of 
confidentiality and immunity using either ASRS or ASAP.  The primary difference 
between ASRS and ASAP are the managers of the program.  ASRS is an FAA program 
designed to apply to all general aviation operators.  However, an operation may have 
their own ASAP, and if it is accepted by the Event Review Committee (ERC) (a division 
of the FAA), the ASAP report is considered the same as an ASRS report (the main 
difference being the ability for the organization to also see the safety concern).  
According to the ASRS website, all reports sent through the system are held in strict 
confidence.  The reports are cleansed by removing times, dates, and any related 
information which could lead to identifying an individual (NASA, 2016).  The ASRS 
website briefly explains additional FAA incentives:  
37 
 
 
The FAA has committed itself not to use ASRS information against 
reporters in enforcement actions.  It has also chosen to waive fines and 
penalties, subject to certain limitations, for unintentional violations of 
federal aviation statutes and regulations which are reported to ASRS.  The 
FAA's initiation, and continued support of the ASRS program and its 
willingness to waive penalties in qualifying cases is a measure of the value 
it places on the safety information gathered, and the products made 
possible through incident reporting to the ASRS.  (NASA, 2016, p.1)  
In 2011, the FAA released Advisory Circular (AC) 00-46E as a replacement to 
AC 00-46D dated February 26, 1997.  AC 00-46D authorizes NASA to continue 
to act as a third-party facilitator to receive and process safety reports as they have 
done since the program inception in 1975.  The AC prohibits the use of any report 
submitted to NASA in any disciplinary action with the exception of criminal 
offenses or information concerning accidents.  
 AC 00-46E specifically states the FAA is required to enforce statute 14 
CFR in a manner that will reduce or eliminate the possibility of aircraft accidents.  
However, there are multiple factors the FAA will consider when enforcing 
statutes including the nature of the violation, experience, attitude, and time since 
last occurrence.  The FAA, in AC-0046E, considers the submission of an ASAP 
report concerning an incident or occurrence to be indicative of a constructive 
attitude, thus even if a violation is found, civil penalty and certificate suspension 
could not be enforced (FAA, 2011).  
38 
 
 
 Restrictions from AC 00-46E (2011) mandate the enforcement shall not be 
imposed if:  
1. The violation was inadvertent and not deliberate;  
2. The violation did not involve a criminal offense, accident, or action under 
49 U.S.C. § 44709, which discloses a lack of qualification or competency, 
which is wholly excluded from this policy; 
3. The person has not been found in any prior FAA enforcement action to 
have committed a violation of 49 U.S.C. subtitle VII, or any regulation 
promulgated there for a period of five years prior to the date of 
occurrence;  
4. The person proves that, within 10 days after the violation, or date when 
the person became aware or should have been aware of the violation, he or 
she completed and delivered or mailed a written report of the incident or 
occurrence to NASA. 
The U.S. Air Force has a different stance toward safety reporting while maintaining a 
mentality of identity-protection through the submission of ASAP reports.  According to 
the USAF ASAP website (asap.safety.af.mil):  
ASAP provides a non-punitive environment for the open reporting of 
safety concerns and information that might not be reported by other 
means.  ASAP reports are identity-protected, meaning if you include your 
name in your report, it will not be made public.  (USAF, 2017, p. 1)  
Available on the website is a link for leadership endorsements from four major 
commands and two Wings.  Colonel Armagost advocates positively for the 
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program in an endorsement to the 5th Bomb Wing at Minot, ND, “…this identity-
protected, self-reporting, and non-punitive program is designed to encourage 
voluntary reporting to highlight a hazardous situation, unintentional error, or 
hidden risk” (2016, p. 1).  In General Carlisle’s endorsement to the Air Combat 
Command, “airmen can use [ASAP] to share a lesson learned beyond their 
squadron” (2014, p. 1).  General Everhart, in his memorandum to Air Mobility 
Command states, “Per AFI 91-225, data collected from ASAP, MFOQA, and 
LOSA will not be used to monitor personnel performance to initiate qualification 
downgrade or decertification, nor to take adverse personnel actions including 
reprimands, nonjudicial punishment, or court-martial” (2015, p. 1).  
 In multiple endorsements from high-level commanders, the ASAP 
website, and the parenting regulation AFI 11-225, ASAP is a non-punitive 
program designed for proactive safety use.  However, no literature exists 
mirroring the FAA’s ability to protect military pilots against violations.  In 
essence, a civil professional pilot may make an error while flying and have the 
ability to escape punishment based on the FAAs criteria listed in AC 00-46E; 
military pilots do not have the same luxury.  Submitting an ASAP in the U.S. 
military does not prohibit charges or punishment being brought against an 
individual.  
Role of the unit commander.  In the U.S. Air Force, unit commanders have the 
ability to assign and remove an operator’s qualifications based on their assessments of 
events.  According to AFI11-202V2, Aircrew Standardization/Evaluation (Stan/Eval) 
Program (2012), the purpose of Stan/Eval is to provide commanders a tool to validate 
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aircrew readiness.  At the higher levels, the major command’s (AETC, AMC, ACC, etc.) 
staffs are responsible for setting policy and establishing administrative processes; lower 
echelons of command are primarily responsible for the flying and evaluation functions.  
AFI 11-202V2 explains the qualification status of flyers: a Q-1 indicates an 
aircrew member is qualified and demonstrates the desired performance and knowledge of 
procedures, equipment, and directives within tolerances specified in grading criteria.  A 
Q-2 indicates a member was able to perform duties safely but there were one or more 
areas where additional training was assigned.  A Q-3 indicates a member demonstrates an 
unacceptable level of safety, performance, or knowledge.  It is important to note that an 
overall grade of Q-1 or Q-2 will be given only after all evaluation requirements have 
been completed; an overall grade of Q-3 may be awarded at anytime to include 
operational, training, or simulator missions (AFI11-202V3, 2012).  Any commander may 
direct a downgrade (Q-3) without administering an evaluation for flying-related cases 
including flight discipline and flight safety (AFI11-202V3, 2012).  Incidents do not have 
to be directly observed by an examiner to earn a Q-3, but may be recommended by an 
examiner from any aircrew specialty; should an operator perform an operation that is 
deemed unsafe or out of tolerances, and if the information is shared with a unit 
commander, the commander may issue a Q-3 to the operator or entire aircrew.  
A commander may not use information provided by ASAP, LOSA, or 
FOQA to reprimand a pilot—a commander cannot use any information gathered 
from a safety source for the purposes of punishment.  However, if a commander 
uses other means to discover information, punishment may be administered (AFI 
91-202, 2016).  
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FAA Enforcement.  The FAA’s power to enforce safety standards and the 
Federal Aviation Regulations allows them to revoke aviation licenses.  There are five 
types of actions the FAA typically uses:  
 Administrative action 
 Reexamination 
 Certificate action 
 Civil penalty 
 Criminal action  
For small safety deviations, the FAA may use administrative action the form of a 
warning notice or letter of correction.  Following recommended FAA training, the case is 
closed.  More commonly, however, certificate actions are taken against pilots by 
suspending or revoking a license.  Operational violations of the flight rules or indication 
of technical proficiency typically are triggers for license suspension (Yodice, 2011).  
Under Reporting 
Reporting adverse events, especially near misses, is essential for improving safety 
(Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015)—safety reports provide useful data-points to help improve 
workplace and occupational safety (Davies & Steinke, 2015).  A significant under-
reporting of safety concerns exists throughout multiple industries (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 
2015).  The effectiveness of a proactive safety program rests with the assumption that a 
free-flow information channel exists and is used judiciously to promote awareness of 
incidents, accidents, unsafe behaviors, and simple concerns (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015).  
According to Gilbey et al. (2015), the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) claims the accurate and timely reporting of relevant information related to 
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hazards reported by front-line personnel is one of the best sources of data.  Despite the 
high-level of suspected under-reporting, some are taking the lead to understand and 
combat the situation, including the New Zealand Civil Aviation Administration 
(NZCAA) (Gilbey et al., 2015).  Literature suggests there are multiple reasons for 
individuals not to report safety concerns to their organization’s management, including 
repercussion, convenience, significance of event, and value (Freiwald, 2013; Griffin & 
Neal; Mullen, 2004; Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein, 1999).  
Safety Culture Effects on Reporting Safety Concerns 
There exists a desired correlation between a positive safety culture and 
individuals submitting safety concerns.  “Findings from Neal and Griffin (2002) support 
the relationship of safety climate and safety behavior….and a similar relationship 
between compliance and safety participation” (Freiwald, 2013, p. 31).  Wiegmann et al. 
(2002) describe safety culture as an enduring value and priority placed on worker and 
public safety … and the extent to which individuals and groups commit to personal 
responsibility to safety, of which is included to communicate safety concerns (Broyhill, 
2016).  
In his dissertation, Freiwald (2013) argues two main issues hamper safety climate: 
1) the nature of the construct and 2) the relationship among safety climate and 
organizational outcomes such as safety knowledge and motivation, safety behavior, and 
workplace accidents.  Freiwald (2013) continues to argue the perceptions of safety 
culture influence employee actions and safety behavior in the workplace.  One direct 
measure of an employee proactively employing safety measures is to provide an ASAP 
report.  Freiwald (2013) argues through the work of Barling et al. (2002) that the 
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perceptions of safety climate mediated a relationship of leadership and safety events, 
which in turn predicted occupational injuries.  The most immediate predictor of 
occupational injuries are safety-related events, or close calls (Barling et al., 2002).  
 Freiwald (2013) discusses the work of Cree and Kelloway (1997) and how safety 
participation, including the initiative of an employee to voluntarily participate in safety 
activities and programs, are active signs of positive safety culture.  Another predictor of 
safety participation is motivation (Griffin & Neal, 2000).  Freiwald (2013) argues through 
positive safety culture and leadership, a positive relationship exists which supports the 
voluntary participation in safety activities.  Freiwald (2013) argues perceived risk directly 
predicts participation (Cree & Calloway, 1997; Goldberg, Dar-El, & Rubin, 1991), 
essentially establishing the significance of an event contributes to response rates.  Mullen 
(2004) argues individuals who experience close calls or safety-related events display 
higher-levels of safety participation (Freiwald, 2013).  
Griffin and Neal (2000) found perceptions of knowledge about safety 
significantly influenced self-reports of safety compliance and safety participation 
(Freiwald, 2013), and positively identifying perceived value in the system attributed to 
higher reporting.  
 Perceived Repercussion.  Fear of reprisal is a large part of under-reporting 
(Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & Himmelstein,1999).  According to Davies and Steinke, a 
mature safety culture is developed where individuals feel free to report safety concerns 
knowing “they will not be shot” (2015, p. 1234).  In a study completed by Cubbin in 
2000, of 563 general-aviation commercial pilots surveyed, 32% admitted they failed to 
disclose a medical treatment on their FAA applications for fear of disqualification or 
44 
 
 
other administrative hardship toward their careers (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015).  In a 
different study by Probst and Estrada (2010), 64 percent of respondents indicated they 
had at least one negative consequence after submitting a safety report, ranging from poor 
impersonal treatment and adverse job outcomes to reassignment of less-favorable tasks.  
Palali and Ours (2017) suggest general statistics about workplace safety are inaccurate 
because workers often under-report safety concerns due to fear of penalty.  Even if 
someone is aware of a safety event, it is possible they will not report the event for fear of 
punishment by management, which is a direct impact from a poor safety culture.  
Medium Convenience.  Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui (2015) hypothesize one possible 
explanation for a lack of safety reporting is the inconvenience of completing the safety 
report itself.  Specifically, Gilbey et al. (2015) discuss the disadvantage of not being able 
to immediately report a situation due to significant other tasks needing to be performed, 
time for completion of the report, or simple memory loss of the event.  For example, a 
pilot experiencing a safety concern on initial takeoff from New York to London may 
have over six hours before a report can be completed.  In that time, memory loss can 
occur, other important tasks will be accomplished, and post-flight activities must be 
completed.  The report, which may require access to an internet connection, telephone, or 
quiet place from which to communicate, can contribute to under-reporting.  In this 
situation, the safety report is considered an unimportant task, especially if the occurrence 
was not considered significant. 
Significance of Event.  Literature suggests the severity of the event-in-question 
affects an individual’s likeliness to report a concern.  In a study conducted by Gilbey, 
Tani, and Tsui, “bad outcomes were judged as more likely to be reported than identical 
45 
 
 
acts with innocuous outcomes” (2015, p. 141) Gilbey et al. (2015) suggest if there is no 
publicity about an event, it may be assumed that the outcome of the concern was 
innocuous, and therefore, the concern was probably groundless.  If the individual 
perceives an event as innocuous, high potential exists for under-reporting.  
Program Value.    Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui (2015) suggest a lack of priority toward 
safety could contribute to an under-reported safety program. Connected to the 
significance of an event, under-reported situations may occur because the time, energy, 
and effort involved in completing a document, along with the effort to follow through 
with the report, may be deemed out of proportion to the perceived significance of the 
event itself.  In addition, if workers feel managers will be unresponsive or unconcerned 
with safety incidents, they are less likely to report concerns (Probst & Estrada, 2010).  If 
no incident investigation or corrective actions are expected from reported accidents, 
employees may feel it is pointless to bring forward information (Probst & Estrada, 2010).  
Survey Use    
 In 2014, Steckel formally published his dissertation “Developing and establishing 
the validity and reliability of the perceptions toward aviation safety action program 
(ASAP) and line operations safety audit (LOSA) questionnaires” (doctoral dissertation).  
Steckel (2014) researched the factors (perceptions) that influence whether an air carrier 
pilot would participate in the ASAP or LOSA program through the use of a survey 
instrument.  Steckel’s research hinged around theory presented by Slovic’s work of 
qualifying specific valuations of risk individuals were willing to accept.  Based on 
identified barriers to safety reporting in aviation and healthcare, along with his extensive 
commercial pilot experience, Steckel developed factors for the ASAP scales.  
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 As part of his dissertation research, Steckel developed a survey instrument which 
was reviewed by a dissertation committee with experience in research methodology and 
organizational psychology along with seven airline pilots.  Feedback was used to further 
refine the factors.  Ultimately, Steckel (2014) was able to utilize five distinct factors 
which contributed to under-reporting in ASAP as researched from his literature review: 
perception of ease of use, perception of value, perception of program trust, perception of 
risk, and perception of management trust.  At the end of his study, Steckel ultimately 
combined perception of risk and perception of management trust into one category.  The 
survey itself contained a minimum of three indicator items for each scale indicator as 
demonstrated in Table 1.  
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Table 1  
 
Scale Indicators and Indicator Items for the ASAP Program 
Survey in Steckel's Dissertation (2014)  
 
  Factor Perception of Ease of Use 
 Item 1 Does not take much time to submit 
 Item 2 Easy to access ASAP program to submit 
 Item 3 Asks for relevant information 
  Factor Perception of Value 
 Item 1 ID hazards 
 Item 2 ID errors 
 Item 3 Worth my time to participate 
 Item 4 Generally effective 
 Item 5 Personal feedback to improve job 
 Item 6 Company communication to improve job 
 Item 7 Improve workplace safety 
 Item 8 Improve work procedures 
 Item 9 Will improve training 
  Factor Perception of Program Trust 
Item 1 People who analyze data can be trusted 
Item 2 ASAP program designed to protect data 
Item 3 Form asks for data that can be traced 
  Factor Perception of Risk 
 Item 1 FAA could initiate enforcement action 
 Item 2 Information released through criminal investigation 
 Item 3 Information released through civil litigation 
 Item 4 Information released through FOIA 
 Factor Perception of Management Trust 
 Item 1 Risk if I don't participate 
 Item 2 Could punish intentional errors 
 Item 3 Could punish unintentional errors   Item 4 Management will protect data 
 
Steckel mailed 60,000 surveys to current FAA commercial pilots and received 
4,400 surveys within a month, of which approximately 2,000 surveys were considered 
usable.  Due to the quantity of surveys received, approximately half of the surveys were 
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used to determine the fit of the model, and the other half were used to confirm the model 
specification.  
Scales were analyzed for reliability and validity using Confirmatory Factor 
Analysis and the split sample method for loose cross-validation.  The structural model 
was measured for validity using convergent and discriminant validity, while reliability of 
the model was analyzed using composite reliability.  Steckel’s results include a change of 
the 5-factor model; the a priori model was not as good of a fit as much as the 4-factor, 
when two of the elements were combined due to a poor construct reliability <0.70 for 
management trust.  The 5-factor scale resulted in 17 items being measured, with each of 
the factors consisting of three indicators.  There was no covariance between the error 
terms.  One particular factor, ease of use (AVE = 0.50), did not show acceptable 
discriminate validity; yet overall, the results showed strong evidence to support using the 
final ASAP model specification (Steckel, 2014).  
 
Figure 3.  Steckel’s ASAP model fit test (2014).  
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Figure 4.  Steckel's ASAP measurement model (2014).  
Steckel was able to determine that of the five factors, the factor ease of use did 
not show acceptable convergent or discriminate validity.  Using Cronbach’s Alpha, the 
other four factors were able to test without problems.  
In his discussion, Steckel suggested a 5-10 member focus group would help 
develop potential factors and scale items for future research.  In 2016, Air Mobility 
Command used a non-validated survey to gain initial feedback about the military ASAP 
program.  The survey closely follows Steckel’s initial survey but is reworded for military 
purposes—Appendix A.  Steckel confirmed in his discussion the ASAP factors had 
acceptable reliability and convergent validity.  
Theoretical Research Model 
The proposed model was composed mainly from Steckel’s dissertation but was 
changed slightly based on literature review.  Steckel initially included five primary 
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factors but later consolidated them into four factors: ease of use, program value, 
program/management trust, and risk.  The proposed hypothetical structural for this 
dissertation used three of the four factors used by Steckel, but renames risk to 
repercussion, ease of use to inconvenience, and program value to perceived value.  The 
proposed structural model included a modified factor, program/management trust, and 
combined it with risk.  The researcher added inconvenience based on literature review.  
A large majority of the literature review was based on safety culture with a basis 
of just culture, reporting culture, and others.  It was the belief of the researcher, based on 
a literature review of safety culture, that an organization that harbors a strong safety 
culture will tend to have a higher reporting rate than not.  For this reason, the researcher 
assumed a basic safety culture exists in AMC based on the SMS being utilized.  The 
research was simply attempting to dig deeper into specifics about the culture which may 
or may lead to operators reporting safety concerns.  If an individual believes an event is 
insignificant, but reports the safety concern anyways, the individual is demonstrating a 
strong safety reporting culture.  
Based on the literature reviewed and the previous study conducted by Steckel, six 
hypotheses were developed in the theoretical model and displayed in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5.  Hypothetical structural model.  
The hypotheses are written explanations of the structural model in Figure 5. 
H1:  Perceived repercussion was positively related to operators submitting ASAP 
reports.  In the proposed path diagram, it was hypothesized that the fear of 
repercussion had a positive influence on a crewmember’s submission of ASAP 
reports—operators who felt they could or would be punished for submitting 
optional safety reports were less likely to report safety concerns.  
H2:  Inconvenience was positively related to operators’ intentions to use ASAP.  It was 
hypothesized that inconvenient processes had a positive influence on operators 
submitting ASAP reports—whether the factor was due to time, other 
responsibilities, or lack of medium to respond, aircrews were more likely not to 
report the safety concern if the medium was inconvenient to do so.  
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H3:  The significance of an event was positively related to operators submitting ASAP 
reports.  It was hypothesized that the significance of an event positively 
influenced an operator’s decision to report safety concerns—if an operator felt the 
event had an insignificant outcome, they were less likely to report the safety 
concern.  
H4:  The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to operators 
submitting ASAP reports.  It was hypothesized the perceived value of the 
program positively influenced whether an operator reported a safety concern—if 
an operator felt there was little value in the program including incentives, follow-
up capabilities, organizational improvement, etc., the operator was less likely to 
report the safety concern.  
H5:  The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to the perceived 
significance of an event.  It was hypothesized that the perceived value of the 
program positively influences how significant the event may appear to the 
operator—an operator who believed there was high value in the program would 
report an event regardless of significance level.  
H6.  The perceived value of the ASAP program was positively related to 
inconvenience.  It was hypothesized that the perceived value of the program 
positively influenced the perceived inconvenience of the program—an operator 
who believed there was significant value in the program would tend to report 
safety concerns, even if the medium was inconvenient.  
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Summary 
The FAA takes great strides to emphasize safety culture by providing incentives 
to aircrew members.  However, the USAF did little to incentivize proactive safety—at the 
time of this study, no reward or inability to protect against retribution for ASAP 
submissions existed in the Air Force.  
A crewmember’s perception of punishment comes from the ability for any 
commander to immediately decertify (Q-3) a crewmember.  While a crewmember may 
receive a Q-3 downgrade on a normal evaluation, it is possible and common for aircrew 
members to receive commander-directed Q-3s, the equivalent to an FAA violation.  
There exists a potential fear of punishment for crewmembers to receive Q-3s from ASAP 
reports, when simple word-of-mouth is enough to start a Q-3 process.  The literature 
indicates the perception of punishment connected with ASAP hampers the submission 
rate.  
The USAF has attempted to make ASAP convenient and available to front-line 
operators.  “Hot keys” exist in computer training programs to allow direct access to the 
ASAP websites.  However, the military ASAP is a government-based website and must 
be accessed on a government machine only.  Combined with long duty days and excess 
amounts of paperwork required to be accomplished post-mission, it was likely ASAP was 
not considered convenient by many aircrews (T. Grosz, personal communication, 15 
September 2016).  In 2017, OpsRAMS conducted an experiment with select reserve 
units.  The intent was to determine if capabilities to report safety concerns on an 
automatically-updating electronic flight bag would encourage reporting.  The results had 
not been published by the time of this writing.  
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Due to lack of incentives, it is likely there was no perceived value or vested 
interest in the military ASAP by front-line operators (T. Grosz, personal communication, 
15 September 2016).  The FAA provided valuable incentives to aviators through ASAP 
by rewarding those who had a safety-driven mindset (NASA, 2016).  Because the FAA 
saw the submission of accurate and timely ASAP reports as an active safety mindset, the 
FAA had the ability to waive certain violations (NASA, 2016).  The military offered no 
similar ability to prevent a downgrade or Q-3 by submitting a safety report, thus offering 
little self-value.  OpsRAMS was primarily responsible for the advocation of ASAP along 
with LOSA and MFOQA.  Through read files, newspapers, safety briefings, magazines, 
and more, the safety team at OpsRAMS strongly attempted to bring awareness about the 
ASAP program to the heart of AMC.  OpsRAMS was interested if more awareness would 
correlate with more reports (T. Grosz, personal communication, 15 September 2016).  
Four potential factors were extracted from the literature and are believed to 
contribute directly to an operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports.  The four factors 
of repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value 
were likely related to the lack of ASAP reports.  
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CHAPTER III  
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The purpose of this dissertation was to determine how much influence four 
potential factors had on operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports; the four factors 
were repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program 
value.  The individual constructs for each factor were developed based off literature 
review and previous research.  The hypotheses were developed from relevant research 
suggesting contributing factors of whether USAF mobility operators submit ASAP 
reports or not.  Structural equation modeling was determined to be the preferential 
statistical method due to the ability investigate relations between sets of observed and 
latent variables (Byrne, 2010).  Once a measurement model was specified for the SEM 
process, an adequate sample size was calculated.  The survey was designed as an 
instrument to produce empirical results using the Likert Scale and was pre-tested for 
validity.  Once the survey proved valid for research, full Institutional Review Board 
procedures were followed to ensure all ethical research procedures were considered.  The 
researcher used the survey to collect data from participating aircrew members at Air 
Mobility Command headquarters and attained the minimum required responses.  Data 
collected from the instrument was compiled, cleaned, and evaluated with descriptive 
statistics, confirmatory factor analysis, and structural equation modeling.  Initial data was 
used as part of a pilot study to assess construct reliability—in this process, some 
individual constructs were removed to ensure reliability.  The rest of the data was used to 
test validity of the measurement model where multiple model-fit tests were used to test 
for validity.  When the model was not initially considered an adequate fit, the researcher 
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adjusted the model as suggested by IBM SPSS AMOS 25.  Once an acceptable fit was 
constructed, the structural model was specified and the data were used to assess validity, 
once again adjusting the model as required for proper fit.  With a valid structural model, 
the hypotheses were analyzed for overall results. 
Research Approach 
This research study was theory-driven in nature—the desired outcome was to 
determine the amount of influence each of the four named factors had on the submission 
rate of ASAP reports in Air Mobility Command.  This study was also non-
experimental—there was no feasible manner for the researcher to manipulate the 
variables in an experimental approach (Vogt et al., 2012).  A survey was determined to be 
most effective in acquiring data.  
According to Vogt et al. (2012), surveys are among the most commonly utilized 
instruments for social and behavioral research and are used for descriptive, explanatory, 
and exploratory purposes (Babbie, 2013).  Survey research is an excellent way to gather 
original data describing a population when the entire population is too large to observe, 
and is a great tool for measuring attitudes and orientations (Babbie, 2013).  The intended 
survey was designed to sample the Air Mobility Command operator structure with belief 
that aircrews who participate would provide honest responses to the questions about 
actual reporting procedures and thoughts.  The survey questions were short, clear, precise 
and presented in a way to avoid ambiguous answers (Babbie, 2013).  
Structural Equation Modeling, a confirmatory approach, is unlike explanatory 
research—the research aims to confirm or deconfirm a specific generalization, usually a 
theory (Vogt, Gardner, & Haeffele, 2012).  According to Byrne (2010), the best-known 
57 
 
 
statistical procedure for investigating relations between sets of observed and latent 
variables is factor analysis.  With factor analysis, the researcher examines the covariation 
among observed variables in order to gather information on the underlying latent 
constructs (Byrne, 2010).  Confirmatory factor analysis is one type of factor analysis used 
by researchers when there is knowledge of the latent variable structure.  The researcher 
can postulate relations between the observed measures and the underlying factors a priori 
in order to test the hypothesized structure statistically.  
Research Design 
This study used a cross-sectional survey design, followed by quantitative analysis, 
by incorporating structural equation modeling (SEM) to test hypotheses in a confirmatory 
manner.  The researcher designed a theoretical model based on published literature and 
hypotheses constructed by the researcher based on literature.  The measurement model 
was tested for an appropriate fit and adjusted as needed, and then used as part of a 
structural model to test hypotheses.  The factors were similarly named from Steckel’s 
research (2014) and given abbreviations as required.  The exogenous variable was 
intention to use ASAP, and the endogenous variables were repercussion, significance of 
event, perceived value, and inconvenience.  
Design and Procedures.  The researcher used confirmatory factor analysis to test 
a measurement model as part of Structural Equation Modeling (SEM).  SEM is a 
methodology for representing, estimating, and testing a network of relationships between 
measured variables and latent constructs, where the causal processes of interest are 
represented by a series of regression equations (Byrne, 2010).  
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The variable constructs hypothesized by the researcher were created based on 
similar research by Steckel (2014); in his model, Steckel (2014) theorized four factors 
contributed to under-reporting: ease of use, value, trust, and risk.  The model for this 
research closely adapted Steckel’s research; however, the researcher also correlated a 
connection between significance of event and perceived value, along with perceived value 
and inconvenience.  
Research Procedures 
 The dissertation followed a general SEM process from Hair et al. (2010), as 
shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6.  Research procedure.  
The researcher defined the individual constructs based on review of existing 
literature.  The measurement model was developed, sample size was established, and a 
research study (survey) was designed based on Steckel’s Ph.D. dissertation (2014) 
instrument (modified for the military environment).  USAF IRB processes were not 
required; however, ERAU IRB processes were completed in accordance with ERAU 
guidelines to ensure safe and ethical procedures were followed.  Once IRB approval was 
gained, the researcher conducted a conducted a pretest, then utilized the survey to gather 
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data and assess the measurement model.  After assessing the measurement model for fit, 
the researcher revised the measurement model to ensure an adequate model fit existed.  
The structural model was specified, and the data was then used to assess the validity of 
the structural model.  The results were then analyzed and published.  
Population/Sample 
The population of interest was Air Force Active Duty, Reserve, and Air National 
Guard mobility operators.  The active duty Air Force are full-time airmen, whose primary 
jobs are all-inclusive to the United States Air Force.  Reservists and Guardsmen often 
participate significantly less than an active duty airmen but utilize the same equipment 
and deploy to the same theater with similar missions.  Of note, only Air Mobility 
Command was being sampled for this research.  Should other commands, to include Air 
Combat Command, Global Strike Command, Air Education Command, and Special 
Operations Command be interested, the same survey could easily be utilized.  Using 
Westland’s (2010) model for SEM sample population, with an anticipated effect size δ of 
0.2, a desired statistical power level of 0.80, 5 latent variables k, 12 observed variables j, 
and a probability level of 0.05, the minimum sample size for model structure was n = 308 
with a recommended minimum sample size of 376.  
Convenience sampling was used to gather the observations at AMC Headquarters, 
Scott AFB, IL.  The individuals partaking in the survey were AMC personnel, to include 
boom operators, loadmasters, and flight engineers who underwent orientation training.  
The individuals going through orientation were collaboration airmen attending advanced 
training from around the world, representing all AMC bases and aircraft.  The orientation 
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courses were two days in length and mandatory for all instructors and aircraft captains-in-
training.  The operators attending the orientation had a minimum of two years of AMC 
flying experience and worked directly with aircraft captains, instructors, and evaluators.  
The operators attending the orientation were very familiar with the flying environment 
and the AMC lifestyle and have been molded specifically by instructors and evaluators as 
they prepared for advanced training.  It was expected, at this point in the upgrade process, 
for the operators attending orientation to have a firm grasp of the aviation environment 
and the safety programs available.  Because OpsRAMS was unable to test the entire 
AMC population without Pentagon approval, they were interested in testing this 
particular group of individuals as a measure of the amount of safety taught by operational 
instructors prior to advanced training.   
Data Collection Device 
The intended research apparatus was a safety culture survey adapted from 
Steckel’s dissertation (2014).  Steckel’s research focused on the FAA ASAP program.  In 
his dissertation, Steckel developed and established the reliability and validity of the 
perceptions toward ASAP, using his survey.  The intended survey for this research has 
many similarities but is altered to be military specific.  The survey asks for professional 
information to include aircraft flown, current base assignment, and military status.  
Steckel’s survey is listed as Appendix C, while the survey for this research is listed in 
Appendix A.  Similar to Steckel, the survey utilized a 5-point Likert scale to assess 
responses.  
In comparison to Steckel’s factors, Table 2 proposed the new factors and 
associated items (Cree & Calloway, 1997; Freiwald, 2013; Griffin & Neal, 2000; Steckel, 
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2014).  Input from AMC safety personnel and experienced Air Force pilots ensured 
strong construct validity.  Three safety subject matter experts were allowed to review the 
survey for both content structure.  Air Force Safety experts had training in SMS, 
preventative safety, and were familiar with the ASAP program.  
 
Table 2 
 
Proposed factors and items for survey use  
 
Factor Repercussion 
Item 1 Truly identity protected 
Item 2 Submit reports despite being wrong 
Item 3 Commanders trust in the program 
Factor Inconvenience 
Item 1 Convenience 
Item 2 Time usage 
Item 3 Post-mission priority 
Factor Significance of an event 
Item 1 Small deviation 
Item 2 Major deviation 
Item 3 Safety of flight, at fault 
Factor Program value 
Item 1 Value is seen 
Item 2 Worth my time 
Item 3 Effective in improving safety 
 
 
Ethical Issues 
 According to Babbie (2013), ethical considerations in survey research are 
relatively minor compared with experimental research due to a simplified and hands-off 
interaction.  However, surveys still attempt to gather private, personal information about 
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individuals; information which is not readily available to the public (Babbie, 2013).  In 
order to maintain ethical standards, multiple safeguards are built into the research.  
 First, participation by the selected individuals is voluntary; simply taking the 
survey constituted consent.  The research garnered Embry-Riddle Aeronautical 
University (ERAU) IRB approval; the survey, methodology, and intent of the research 
were all submitted for review.  In the review, it was stipulated that consent to take the 
survey was given by the fact that the individuals participate, as long as a pre-read script 
was either read or provided to the subject (Appendix B).  The survey itself explained the 
consent needed, and in addition, the pre-read script described the purpose of the research, 
the ability for the survey to be identity protected, and the ability to quit the survey at any 
time.  The researcher provided details in writing (refer to Appendix B) about the purpose 
of the survey and the particulars about participation.  Participation was voluntary; the 
participants could decide to quit the survey at any time or refuse the study completely.  
The survey promoted privacy and protection from harm to the individuals—all answers 
remained confidential with no personal information attempted to be collected or any 
efforts made to identify individuals.  Participants could skip any question, and the survey 
administer would not insist upon completed surveys.  All surveys were stored in the 
AMC Safety headquarters in a protected location.  
Pretest 
A pretest was administered to ensure strong face validity.  The survey instrument 
was pre-tested in a similar manner to Tayyem, Atkinson, and Martin’s (2014) procedures: 
Tayyem et al. tested a survey using 12 individuals who were not subsequently used for 
the research.  The individuals taking the test were asked questions about the readability, 
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relevance, and impact of the questions to test for face and content validity.  Feedback and 
comments from the group were analyzed by a panel of experts to modify ambiguous 
terms, clarify confusion, and formulate new ideas as required.  The goal was to ensure the 
participants understand the questions and were responding to the questions as designed 
for the construct.  If participants of the pretest were confused by wording or it was clear 
the intent of the question was misleading, the questions were either removed or reworded.  
Face Validity.  Face validity is a subjective way of essentially ensuring the 
concepts are actually measuring what is intended (Hair et al., 2010) and is measured by 
analyzing the measures in each construct to ensure intentions were met.  Face validity 
was analyzed by experienced aviation safety professionals who examined the instrument 
prior to implementation as part of the pretest.  
SEM Assumptions 
When testing SEM, there were some required underlying test assumptions that 
exist.  One of the biggest assumptions that must be made for SEM is that the data must 
have a multivariate normal distribution (Byrne, 2010).  In addition,  three critically 
important assumptions exist with the use of the ordinal data: (1) under each categorical 
observed variable was an unobserved, normally distributed latent variable; (2) the sample 
size was large enough to sufficiently enable reliable estimation; and (3) the number of 
observed variables was kept to a minimum (Byrne, 2010).  Prior to conducting analysis of 
the measurement model, the data needed to be prepared by treating for missing data, 
testing normality assumptions, and searching for outliers.   
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Data Collection 
The survey was handed-out in paper format to each upgrading operator at the 
safety conference.  The surveys were collected and mailed to the researcher who input the 
results into IBM SPSS.  Even though the survey was optional, a high level of 
participation was anticipated and unofficially occurred.  The only demographic 
information collected was current upgrading aircraft and location.  No internal 
information was solicited, and the researcher did not attempt to match information to any 
individuals as a means to uphold anonymity.  Non-response is possible for multiple 
reasons, typically including poorly constructed surveys, lengthy surveys, inappropriate 
audiences, or the inconvenience of the process.  A large non-response was not anticipated 
due to the short survey which was handed-out in person to a specific target.  The survey 
itself took less than five minutes to complete and was extremely convenient to enable 
operators to participate.  Of the 386 surveys handed to participants, all 386 were returned.  
Although only 332 were usable due to missing information, strong participation was 
observed in the study. 
Treatment of the Data 
 This study used SEM as a primary means of analyzing data.  SEM is a “statistical 
methodology that takes a confirmatory approach to the analysis of a structural theory” 
(Byrne, 2010, p. 3).  Steps included analyzing descriptive statistics followed by 
performing a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) on a measurement model.  Prior to 
conducting analysis, the data was prepared to include treatment of missing data, 
assumption testing, outliers, and transformation.  
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Data Preparation and Missing Data.  Because SEM does not handle missing 
data well, each survey questionnaire with missing data was considered for either 
complete removal of all data or the imputation of data.  There are multiple considerations 
for whether to remove a questionnaire or simply impute the data, and Hair et al. (2010) 
discuss an entire process to determine the outcome of missing data.  If the data is 
considered missing at random (MAR), an imputation process may be used to estimate the 
missing values, based on valid values of other variables (Hair et al., 2010).  The mean 
substitution method is easily implemented and provides all cases with complete 
information; however, it will reduce variance of the distribution, will slightly distort the 
distribution, and will depress observed correlations (Hair et al., 2010).  This method is 
good for relatively low levels of missing data.  Mean substitution replaces the missing 
value with the mean value of all available data of that variable.  Had an individual survey 
returned with more than 25% missing data, the survey would have been considered for 
removal.  Had an individual question been omitted more than 25%, it would have been 
considered for removal.  No single question returned more than 25% missing data.  
Outliers.  Outliers can be measured using the Mahalanobis D2 testing (Hair et al., 
2010).  It is suggested conservative level of significance (.005 or.001) be used as a 
threshold value as an outlier; thus, observations having a D2 value exceeded 3 or 4 in 
large samples can be designated as a possible outlier (Hair et al., 2010).  Once identified, 
the researcher has the option to omit or retain the data.  In this study, the data was 
retained to prevent the risk of limiting generalizability.  
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Assumptions Testing and Transformation.  Data transformation provides a 
means to modify variables to either correct violations or to improve correlations between 
variables (Hair et al., 2010).  While many techniques exist for transforming data, 
transformation was not required for this study, as all assumptions were met.  It was 
necessary to test for multivariate normal data; some questions that returned bi-model 
results were removed from the study.  
Construct Validity.  According to Hair et al. (2010), it is essential to measure the 
items studied to ensure they actually represent the constructs they were expected to 
measure, as alluded to by the literature.  The formula for construct validity (CR) utilized 
was:  
 
wherein the squared sum of standardized loadings was divided by the sum of the 
squared sum of standardized loadings and the sum of indicator measurement errors.  The 
researcher used Microsoft Excel to compute the validity.  
Convergent Validity.  There are many ways to measure convergent validity 
(CV).  CV is the degree to which multiple measures which should theoretically be related 
are actually related (Hair et al., 2010).  Convergent validity for this study was measured 
using the standard equation for average variance extracted (AVE), along with factor 
loadings (Hair et al., 2010). 
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Discriminant Validity.  Discriminant validity analyzes if each section is truly 
unique and distinct to itself.  It is also the measurement to determine if sections that 
should not be related are not actually related (Hair et al., 2010).  Discriminant validity 
usually exists if a computed number less than 0.85 was calculated using the correlation 
equation.  The correlation equations were used, along with an additional method to 
compare MSV with AVE, a commonly accepted method of testing discriminant validity.  
Instrument Reliability.  Reliability is the “degree to which the observed variable 
measures the ‘true’ value and is ‘error free’” (Hair et al., 2010, p. 8), and was tested in 
this research using Cronbach’s Alpha.  The instrument of interest was a modified version 
of Steckel’s proven ASAP survey instrument.  The new instrument was reviewed by three 
experts to ensure the survey was not a time-stamped instrument.  Their bios are listed in 
Appendix E.  Experts were chosen based on their previous experience with peer-reviewed 
instrument implementation and aviation knowledge to ensure the questions were 
sufficient to meet the intent of the survey without dating the instrument.  The pretest was 
used to identify poor reliability using Cronbach’s Alpha, with Hair et al. (2010) 
suggesting ranges >.70.  Ranges less than .70 were considered for revision as the question 
indicated a lower limit of acceptability.   
The data was analyzed by SPSS for general statistics to include means, standard 
deviations, skewness, and kurtosis.  Frequency diagrams will be provided to visually 
decode the data.  The data itself was only cleaned and analyzed for the purposes of safety 
information: no attempt was made to identify respondents or correlate identities with any 
responses.  A demographic about the current main weapons system (MWS) and location 
was collected; however, no correlation between information and individuals took place.  
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Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The next step in data analysis was a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA).  While 
exploratory factor analysis (EFA) is designed for situations where relationships between 
observed and latent variables are unknown, CFA is more appropriate for the situation 
where relationships are either known or hypothesized (Byrne, 2010).  Because the CFA 
model focuses solely on the link between factors and their associated measured variables, 
the created framework becomes the measurement model (Byrne, 2010).  In addition, 
because the literature indicated multiple facets may influence an operator’s decision to 
submit a safety report, along with a verified model from Steckel (2014), it was 
appropriate to use confirmatory factor analysis to validate the proposed model.  For this 
purpose, it was essential to validate there were no missing data points and test for normal 
data.  SPSS was used to identify skewness and kurtosis.  
The first-order CFA model was designed and tested for the multidimensionality of 
theoretical construct, and thus the first assessment was to test if the intention to use ASAP 
is a four-factor model comprising of repercussion, significance of event, perceived value, 
and inconvenience.  The model was input into IBM SPSS AMOS 25 to perform the factor 
analysis.  The model fit indices, as suggested by Byrne (2010), included x2 statistics, 
RMSEA, GFI, CMIN/df, CFI, and NFI.  Acceptable suggestions for optimal values 
included:  
 RMSEA – <.06 
 GFI – >.90 
 AGFI— >.90 
 CFI – >.95 
 CMIN/df – ൑ 3 
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 NFI – >.90 
 
The model was hypothesized as “fitting” by using a goodness-of-fit (GOF) test 
and looking for unreasonable estimates or correlations ( >1.00, negative variances, or 
invalid correlation matrices) (Byrne, 2010).  GOF indicates how well the model 
reproduces the observed covariance matrix among the indicator items (Hair et al., 2010) 
and was used by observing both the chi-square GOF test and the degrees of freedom 
GOF.  Other tests considered were the goodness-of-fit index (GFI), root mean square 
error of approximation (RMSEA), and normed chi-square. 
The presence of standard errors that were either too small or too large suggested 
inaccurate estimations; however, as defined by Joreskog and Sorbom (1989), no true 
“small” or “large” have been established or defined (Byrne, 2010).  After careful 
examination of the model, a post hoc analysis was needed to either accept the model or 
adjust and veer toward the explanatory approach.  
After a satisfactory model fit, the model was tested for construct reliability and 
construct validity (both convergent and discriminant will be addressed).  “Reliability is a 
measure of the degree to which a set of indicators of a latent construct is internally 
consistent based on how highly interrelated the indicators are with each other” (Hair et 
al., 2010, p. 548).  Construct validity measures the extent to which the measured 
variables actually represent the theoretical latent construct they are designed to measure 
(Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010).  The measurement model depicted specific rules 
of correspondence between measured and latent variables—once the constructs were 
defined, the models were used to assess the end of measurement error, or reliability (Hair 
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et al., 2010).  Convergent validity was assessed using average variance extracted (AVE) 
with >.5 indicating an acceptable response (Hair et al., 2010). A  reliability test was 
utilized with the construct reliability (CR), with appropriate measures being >.70 (Hair et 
al., 2010).  
Once the tests were accepted by the researcher, the structural model was 
established and tested.  In a similar manner to the CFA performed on the measurement 
model, the structural model was evaluated for fit and the hypotheses were reviewed using 
standard regression weights and p-values for each relationship.  
Summary 
Individual constructs were developed based on a prior study and literature review.  
A measurement model was developed, and a sample size was addressed.  The survey was 
created, and a pilot study was conducted to ensure usability.  ERAU IRB procedures were 
strictly followed to ensure proper ethical considerations were accounted for.  Using the 
survey, data was collected specifically targeting six hypotheses based on relevant 
research suggesting contributing factors of whether an operator submits an ASAP report 
or not.  The data-collection instrument was designed to measure the amount of influence 
each factor has on an individual’s decision to report safety concerns.  Data collected from 
the instrument was compiled, cleaned, and evaluated with descriptive statistics.  After a 
pretest, the measurement model was tested using confirmatory factor analysis, and then 
the structural model was evaluated for fitness.  The results are published in Chapter IV.  
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CHAPTER IV  
RESULTS 
The purpose of this study was to determine how much influence four potential 
factors have on operator’s intentions to submit ASAP reports; the four factors were: 
repercussion, inconvenience, significance of an event, and perceived program value.  To 
complete the study, the researcher collected data using surveys and analyzed the 
information using IBM SPSS AMOS 25.  The data was analyzed based on the structural 
model shown in Figure 9.  This chapter discusses the primary findings to include 
descriptive statistics, the measurement model assessment using confirmatory factor 
analysis, and the structural model assessment using structural equation modeling.  
Pilot Study 
The researcher received 58 surveys specifically for the pilot study.  Of those 
surveys, 10 were unusable due to missing data on eight of the responses--the respondents 
completed less than two thirds of the survey (the back of the survey was not completed); 
one respondent did not complete the survey at all, and one survey had multiple missed 
questions.  The remaining dataset of 48 samples was used to test for normality and 
outliers, and then the reliability of the constructs using Cronbach’s Alpha.  Table 3 shows 
the reliability analysis.  Cronbach’s Alpha was used to test reliability of each construct, 
with alpha >.7 being the acceptable limit.  
 The constructs inconvenience, significance of event, program value, and operator 
submits safety concern did not show acceptable reliability limits.  Looking at the 
histogram, it was determined that questions 5, 9, and 20 had poor kurtosis levels and were 
removed.  In removing some questions, the construct inconvenience was reduced to only 
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two indicators; however, reducing the construct to two indicators still showed an 
acceptable reliability of 0.767.  Kline writes the rules for identifying a standard CFA 
model include a model which has “two or more factors where each factor has two or 
more indicators” (2016, p. 201), and thus allows the inconvenience permissible with only 
two indicators.  
 The construct operator reports safety concern was scored for Cronbach’s Alpha 
at 0.653, lower than the .7 recommended.  However, due to the literature review and 
researcher’s opinion, the reliability analysis is noted and will continue with the model.  
The descriptive statistics for each question are presented in Table 4. 
  
Table 3 
     
Pilot Study 
 Original  Modified 
Construct Cronbach's Alpha 
Number of 
indicators 
Cronbach's 
Alpha 
Number of 
indicators 
Retribution 0.765 7 0.765 7 
Significance of Event 0.694 5 0.757 3 
Program value 0.694 6 0.725 5 
Inconvenience 0.509 3 0.767 2 
Operator Reports 0.416 6 0.653 3 
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Table 4      
      
Descriptive Statistics of Individual Questions         
Question 
# N Minimum Maximum Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 48 1 4 1.50 0.619 
2 48 1 4 1.79 0.824 
3 48 1 4 2.54 0.874 
4 48 1 4 2.46 0.824 
5 48 1 5 3.58 0.895 
6 48 1 5 3.96 0.988 
7 48 1 5 2.71 1.031 
8 48 1 5 3.71 0.944 
9 48 1 5 2.71 0.967 
10 48 1 5 2.25 0.838 
11 48 1 5 3.44 0.848 
12 48 1 5 3.63 0.959 
13 48 1 5 3.29 1.129 
14 48 1 5 2.17 0.953 
15 48 1 5 2.54 1.051 
16 48 1 5 2.06 0.932 
17 48 1 5 2.40 1.005 
18 48 1 5 2.02 0.934 
19 48 1 5 2.63 0.959 
20 48 2 5 4.06 0.727 
21 48 1 4 1.75 0.700 
22 48 1 5 2.48 1.010 
23 48 2 5 3.56 0.943 
24 48 1 5 2.25 0.978 
25 48 1 4 2.15 0.714 
26 48 1 4 2.40 0.736 
27 48 1 5 2.73 1.067 
28 48 1 4 2.17 0.559 
29 48 1 5 3.23 1.036 
6n 48 1 5 2.04 0.99 
8n 48 1 5 2.29 0.94 
11n 48 1 5 2.56 0.85 
12n 48 1 5 2.38 0.96 
19n 48 1 5 3.38 0.96 
20n 48 1 4 1.94 0.73 
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Demographics and Descriptive Statistics 
 After pretesting, large scale surveying was conducted.  Participants included 
operators from all airframes and locations across AMC; however, there were no 
distinguishing measures to determine gender, age, or race.  The data response used 332 
samples (302 minimum) of which 88% were Active Duty, 3.3% National Guard, and 
7.8% Reserve.  Six responses did not specify their military status.  Table 5shows the 
represented airframes, while Table 6 shows the represented locations.  In Table 5, the 
Active Duty unclassified percentages were provided by OpsRAMS, and does not include 
the Reserve/Guard C-17/C-5/C-130H percentages.  The participant percentage is close to 
the actual percentage of Active Duty distributions but does not accurately account for 
Guard / Reserves.  The information regarding percentage of pilots allocated to each base 
location is considered classified and unable to be reported in this dissertation.  However, 
rates were highest among the largest bases of McChord, Travis, Charleston, and 
Fairchild, each of the four largest AMC bases.  It is unknown if each base was equally 
represented.     
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Table 5 
   
 
AMC MWS Representation 
 
 
Airframe Frequency 
Participation 
Percent 
Current AD 
Percentage 
(unclassified) 
No response 6 1.8  
C-130H 6 1.8 0 
C-130J 56 16.9 18 
C-17 117 35.2 32 
C-37 2 .6 1 
C-21 9 2.7 1 
C-5 12 3.6 7 
KC-10 34 10.2 14 
KC-135 90 27.1 27 
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Table 6 
     
AMC Base Location 
 
Base location Frequency Percent 
No Response 11 3.3 
Andrews 4 1.2 
Birmingham 1 0.3 
Charleston 29 8.7 
Dobbins 1 0.3 
Dover 23 6.9 
Dyess 23 6.9 
Elmendorf 2 0.6 
Fairchild 26 7.8 
Ft. Bragg 2 0.6 
Grissom 1 0.3 
Hickam 9 2.7 
Kadena 13 3.9 
Little Rock 27 8.1 
MacDill 5 1.5 
March 2 0.6 
McChord 34 10.2 
McConnell 30 9.0 
McGuire 29 8.7 
Memphis 2 0.6 
Niagra 1 0.3 
Ohio Grd 1 0.3 
Pease 1 0.3 
Ramstein 2 0.6 
Salt Lake City 5 1.5 
Scott 9 2.7 
Seymour Johnson 2 0.6 
Stewart 2 0.6 
Travis 31 9.3 
Wright Patterson 2 0.6 
Yokota 2 0.6 
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The highest response rates were from C-17s (35.2%) and McChord AFB (10.2%).  There 
were 30 missing values in the entire data set of 362 responses; the 30 surveys with 
missing data were removed from the study.  A non-response bias test was not conducted 
due to high response rates. 
Descriptive Statistics 
The model contained five factors which ultimately measured hypothesized 
relationships.  Creative programming was necessary for the software to correctly analyze 
questions which needed to be inverted in nature.  Many of the questions were asked in the 
negative but needed positive correlation for the model hypothesis and were reversed 
scored for programming use.  Throughout the report, those questions that were reversed 
scored have an “n” proceeding the question number (i.e.: 6n).  Table 6 provides the 
frequency, minimum, maximum, mean, and standard deviation of each question.  
The individual histograms for each factor provided insight prior to SEM analysis.  
Most of the responses were normal with a correct skewness; however, a few showed 
abnormal results and were immediately considered for removal.  Questions 5, 11, and 23 
showed a poor normal distribution curve, and question 29 was bi-modal.  All four 
questions were immediately removed.  
With regard to inconvenience, question 5 was removed from the model because of 
poor distribution.  With regard to repercussion, 81% percent of the operators did not feel 
they would be punished for their ASAP reports; 51% of the response indicated they felt 
their identity was truly protected.  Forty-eight percent of the responses indicated they 
could actually trust their commanders if reports were made.  Seventy-four percent 
indicated they had trust in the higher headquarters to positively protect identities; fifty-
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four percent of the responses indicated operators felt ASAP would not be used negatively 
against them.  Thirty percent indicated they were comfortable providing a name with 
their report.  
 With regard to significance of event, 24% indicated they would report a small 
event, while 85% indicated they would report a large event.  With regard to program 
value, 91% of the operators positively felt ASAP currently has value, and 67% believe 
policies have been changed because of responses.  Eighty-four percent of the operators 
felt it was worth their time to use ASAP, and 70% felt the reports have actually been used 
to change procedures.  Sixty-five percent of the operators felt ASAP reports that were 
communicated changed the way they performed their job.  Overall, 84% felt ASAP was 
good for improving safety.  
Measurement Model Assessment  
The measurement model, using confirmatory factor analysis, involved data 
screening, model evaluation/adjustment, and respecification.  The model was run as seen 
in Figure 7.  
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Figure 7.  Measurement model.  
Normality was examined immediately after the CFA was run.  Upon examination of the 
kurtosis values for normality, only one of the questions indicated higher than a value of 3: 
question #18 (4.321).  Byrne (2010) argues a kurtosis level of less than 5 is still 
acceptable; however, question 18 raises doubts about acceptability.  The question was 
ultimately not deleted, due to still being acceptable (less than 5).  
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 After checking for normality, outliers were examined.  Looking for outliers, using 
the Mahalanobis d-squared output, Byrne (2010) does not suggest removing outliers from 
the data, but rather simply understanding what may affect the output.  In the output 
section, there were no Mahalanobis d-squared values greater than 100, indicating no need 
to examine data for outliers.  
Ensuring the data fit the model, there were multiple fit indexes provided by 
AMOS.  Due to an initial poor model fit indicating inconclusive results, a post-hoc 
analysis was required after modifying the model.  The model specification was performed 
by looking at modification indexes (MI) and adding covariance in the AMOS model 
between suggested errors based on large error terms.  Once the error terms were covaried, 
the model improved and achieved good model fit.  Table 7 shows the initial and modified 
fit statistics, which indicates the initial measurement model was not within tolerances. 
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Table 7 
    
Model Fit Indices for Initial and Final Measurement Model 
 
Model Fit 
Indices  
Acceptance 
Value 
Initial 
Measurement 
Model 
Adjusted 
Measurement 
Model 
GFI > 0.90 0.836 0.933 
AGFI > 0.90 0.785 0.902 
NFI > 0.90 0.736 0.901 
CFI > 0.95 0.781 0.953 
CFMIN/df < 3.00 4.295 1.797 
RMSEA < 0.06 0.196 0.049 
 
 
The Chi-square value associated with the model is significant, X2 = 63.220 (df =38, p = 
.006).  By covarying based on the modified indices, the adjusted CFA model shows 
satisfactory index limits as indicated in Table 6 and thus good model fit.  Throughout the 
process of gaining an acceptable model, it was continuously modified 16 times, due to 
construct validity testing.  
Validity Testing 
 Convergent validity, the extent to which measures of the same construct are 
correlated, can be used by looking at both factor loadings or testing for AVE.  In this 
case, factor loadings greater than .7 are good, with greater than .5 being acceptable (Hair 
et al, 2010).  Three separate responses were questionably low: numbers 13, 19n, and 26.  
After calculating AVE, the PV and R constructs were slightly low (<.5), and the ORSC 
construct was significantly low (.228), indicating poor validity.  It is therefore concluded 
there is not significant evidence to suggest acceptable convergent validity, and changes 
were needed to be made by examining the previously mentioned questions.  By removing 
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one scale item at a time and re-running the CFA model, convergent validity could be re-
evaluated. 
Changes were made by considering the removal of scale items and re-evaluating 
for normality, outliers, model fit, and once again testing for validity.  ORSC was 
significantly low to start, indicating less than a value of .5.  Question 13 was removed, 
and the entire process was re-evaluated.  As the removal of questions continued, 
normality and outliers were not a factor, as they tested acceptable each time.  However, a 
good model fit required covarying error terms with the new CFA model being run each 
time.  Eventually, questions 19n and 26 were also separately removed, finally providing 
an acceptable convergent validity score for ORSC of 0.531.  In doing so, other constructs 
also needed examining; perceived value also had initial poor AVE with a score of only 
0.3998.  Significant removal of questions was required, as seen in the final SEM model to 
achieve a valid test.  The construct repercussion required the removal of a single item.  
The final validity scores can be seen in Table 8 with the AVE scores listed.  A value of 
greater than .5 is considered acceptable.  
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Table 8 
   
AVE Measured Against the 5 Factors 
 
 AVE 
 
Initial 
Model 
Modified 
 Model 
PV 0.3998 0.584 
SE 0.5152 0.684 
R 0.4364 0.531 
I 0.5056 0.567 
ORSC 0.2283 0.531 
 
  
After testing for normality, outliers, a good model fit, and finally convergent 
validity, the model was tested for discriminant validity.  Discriminant validity (distinctive 
validity), the extent to which constructs are distinct, was tested by comparing maximum 
shared variance (MSV) with AVE, with a valid test showing all MSV less than the 
corresponding AVE values as seen in Table 9.  
 
Table 9 
 
Discriminate Validity Results 
    
Squared Correlation    AVE 
R <--> SE 0.177  I 0.567 
R <--> PV 0.096  R 0.531 
I <--> R 0.036  SE 0.684 
R <--> ORSC 0.101  PV 0.584 
SE <--> PV 0.198  ORSC 0.531 
I <--> SE 0.078    
SE <--> ORSC 0.511    
I <--> PV 0.150    
PV <--> ORSC 0.292    
I <--> ORSC 0.133       
85 
 
 
 
Reliability Testing 
Reliability is the ability for a measure to be consistent over time.  To test for good 
construct reliability or composite reliability (CR), the sum of factor loadings was 
calculated for each construct as seen in Table 10.  
 
Table 10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
An acceptable value for construct reliability is greater than 0.7.  After testing for 
normality, outliers, model fit and validity, all constructs demonstrated satisfactory 
construct reliability (>.7), and thus the measurement model was considered complete.  
The primary changes were due to the removal of factors in the reliability testing process.  
The final model fit statistics are shown in Table 11 and indicate a good model fit.  Figure 
8 provides the pictorial final model used for testing.  Table 12 shows the factor loadings.  
 
 
Construct Reliability 
  
Construct  CR 
Inconvenience 0.819 
Repercussion 0.817 
Significance of Event 0.899 
Program Value 0.881 
ORSC 0.806 
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Table 11 
    
Model Fit Indices for Final Measurement Model 
  
Model Fit 
Indices  
Acceptance 
Value 
Adjusted 
Measurement 
Model 
Final 
Measurement 
Model 
GFI > 0.90 0.933 0.960 
AGFI > 0.90 0.902 0.937 
NFI > 0.90 0.901 0.959 
CFI > 0.95 0.953 0.983 
CMIN/df < 3.00 1.797 1.664 
RMSEA < 0.06 0.049 0.045 
 
Table  12    
    
Factor Loadings of Measurement Model 
    
4 <--- I 0.543 
3 <--- I 0.917 
12n <--- R 0.74 
8n <--- R 0.801 
6n <--- R 0.636 
15 <--- SE 0.851 
17 <--- SE 0.892 
14 <--- SE 0.73 
28 <--- PV 0.547 
25 <--- PV 0.933 
18 <--- ORSC 0.777 
16 <--- ORSC 0.677 
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Figure 8.  Final Measurement model. 
 
Structural Model Testing (SEM)   
With a validated measurement model, the final model was constructed, based on 
the hypotheses being tested.  Figure 9 shows the final SEM model.  The model was tested 
for normality, outliers, demonstrated acceptable kurtosis values (<.500), and minimal D2 
values.  
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Figure 9.  Standardized path coefficients for SEM.  
Model fit was observed using the same method as the CFA model with the results 
shown in Table 13.  The model had a good fit with the exception of a slightly high 
RMSEA.  AMOS suggested covarying the R and PV constructs, and when doing so, the 
model demonstrated acceptable fit.  When looking at the M.I. values in the AMOS 
output, there were no significantly high values to note, suggesting there were no longer 
any new relationships to potentially consider.  
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Table 13 
 
Model Fit for 
Structural Model  
     
 Desired Original Modified 
CMIN/df <3.0 2.378 2.128 
GFI >0.9 0.948 0.959 
AGFI >0.9 0.904 0.923 
NFI >0.9 0.925 0.943 
CFI >0.95 0.950 0.968 
RMSEA <0.060 0.072 0.058 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 The hypotheses are restated for convenience.  
H1: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports.  
H2: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting ASAP reports. 
H3: The significance of an event is positively related to operators submitting ASAP 
reports. 
H4: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to operators 
submitting ASAP reports. 
H5: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to significance of 
event. 
H6. The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively related to inconvenience.  
Figure 9 illustrates the standardized path coefficients for the model.  The numbers 
indicate the standard regression weight each factor has on another, or the amount of 
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comparative influence each has.  As seen in the figure, Significance of Event (SE) has the 
greatest influence on Operator Reports Safety Concern (ORSC) at .53.  Program Value 
(PV) had a moderate influence of .36.  PV also had influences on SE and I of .11 and .52 
respectively. Table 14 shows the actual structural model hypothesis testing statistics.  
 
Table 14 
       
Structural Model Hypothesis Testing 
     
Hypothesis     
Standardized 
Estimate t-value p-value Result 
H1: Repercussion  Operator Reports -0.05 -0.966 0.334 Not Supported 
H2: Inconvenience  Operator Reports 0.07 0.878 0.38 Not Supported 
H3: Sig of Event  Operator Reports 0.53 9.71 *** Supported 
H4: Program Value  Operator Reports 0.36 2.481 0.013 Supported 
H5: Program Value  Sig of Event 0.11 6.691 *** Supported 
H6: Program Value  Inconvenience 0.52 3.756 *** Supported 
Note. p = significant at 0.05.  
 
H1 was not supported.  Repercussion was not positively related to Operator 
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (R, ORSC) = -.05.  The data does 
not support that the more an operator felt there would be no fear of repercussion, the 
more likely the operator was to report a safety concern.  The relationship was not 
significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p=0.334).  
H2 was also not supported.  Inconvenience was positively related to Operator 
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (I, ORSC) = .07; however, because 
the p-value was so high, it is not acceptable to say the more an operator felt the ASAP 
process was convenient to use, the more likely the operator was to report a safety 
concern.  This relationship was not significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p=0.38).  
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H3 was supported.  Significance of Event was positively related to Operator 
Reports Safety Concerns, Standardized Path Coefficient (SE,ORSC) = .53, indicating the 
more an operator felt the event was of significant nature, the more likely the operator was 
to report the safety concern.  The relationship was statistically significant at the 
significance level of 0.05 (p<0.001).   
H4 hypothesized a positive relationship between Program Value and Operator 
Reports Safety Concerns, and this hypothesis was also supported, Standardized Path 
Coefficient (PV,ORSC) = .36, indicating that program value is an appropriate indicator to 
predict if operators will report safety concerns.  The relationship was statistically 
significant at the significance level of 0.05 (p<0.013).  
H5 was supported.  Program Value was positively related to Significance of 
Event, Standardized Path Coefficient (PV,SE) = .11, indicating that individuals who thought 
there was value in the program were more likely to report events of all significance.  The 
relationship was statistically significant at the significance level of .005 (p < .001). 
H6 was supported.  Program Value was positively related to Inconvenience, 
Standardized Path Coefficient (PV,I)  = .52, indicating that individuals who thought there 
was value in the program were more likely to report events regardless of how 
inconvenient the process was.  The relationship was statistically significant at the 
significance level of .005 (p < .001). 
Alternate Theory 
The structural model had a good fit with the exception of a slightly high RMSEA.  
Within the results, IBM SPSS AMOS 25 suggested covarying the R and PV constructs.  
When covarried, the model still demonstrated acceptable fit.  Because this study was 
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confirmatory in nature and not exploratory, further analysis was not considered for this 
dissertation.  However, it is important to note that two hypotheses of the structural model 
were not supported, while an additional theoretical model was supported.  If this was the 
case, the potential new alternate theory would look like Figure 10, where repercussion 
influences program value.  
 
 
Figure 10.  Alternate theory model.  
 
Summary 
 This chapter presents the analytical results of the structural model.  Three hundred 
and sixty-two surveys were returned, with 30 surveys being removed due to incomplete 
data.  The data were tested for normality and outliers and produced no significant results 
requiring attention.  The CFA model was run and tested for model fit.  With a poor model 
fit, multiple covariations were required to satisfy all the required restraints.  With each 
iteration of the model being adjusted, it was necessary to continuously test for normality 
and outliers before testing for a good model fit and evaluating validity and reliability.  
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 The final structural model (SEM) was tested for model fit and was found to have 
exceptional fit after a simple covariance suggested by AMOS.  The results indicate four 
of the six hypotheses are supported.  The next chapter draws conclusions and suggests 
potential research considerations for the future.  
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CHAPTER V  
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Today, safety reporting is a prime example of preventative safety and how 
organizations can gather safety information to help prevent an accident before the mishap 
occurs (Stolzer, Goglia, & Halford, 2008).  As aircraft became more expensive and 
aircrew become more valuable, it is necessary to transition to a new philosophy of safety 
culture—one which seeks to prevent accidents through proactive measures (Brady, 2000).  
The presented research investigated the relationships among different factors which 
influenced whether an operator chose to report a safety concern.  The desired subjects of 
study were all Air Force operators, but for the purposes of this study, the field of 
participants was narrowed to upgrading operators in Air Mobility Command.  The 
purpose of this study was to determine how much influence four potential factors had on 
operators’ intentions to submit ASAP reports—one of three primary proactive safety 
programs being used by the Air Force. 
Literature suggests there are multiple reasons why individuals choose not to 
report safety concerns, including repercussion, convenience, significance of event, and 
value (Freiwald, 2013; Griffin & Neal; Mullen, 2004; Pransky, Snyder, Allard, & 
Himmelstein, 1999).  Six different relationships were proposed as hypotheses, with the 
data suggesting positive relationships exist among four of the six hypotheses.  The data 
did not suggest a positive relationship existed between repercussion and reporting, and 
the data did not suggest a statistically positive relationship existed between inconvenience 
and reporting.  
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Discussion of the Results   
Sample Characteristics.  Gender and age were not considered important 
demographics in this research.  Looking at the characteristics of those who participated in 
the study, the results indicate the most surveys came from C-17 and subsequently KC-
135 pilots, with a majority of the responses coming from Travis AFB, Charleston AFB, 
and McChord AFB.  These responses tie with the fact that a large majority of assets 
operated by AMC are indeed C-17s and KC-135s.  The sample closely mimics the Active 
Duty pilot force; however, the Guard and Reserve components are not accurately 
measured.  In addition, this survey happened to gather only pilots and did not sample 
other mobility aircrew positions.  The data is effective in representing AMC Active Duty 
Pilots.  
Hypothesis Results  
Zohar (2010) specifically argued a strong safety climate would lead to a reduction 
in accidents.  One indication of the prevention of accidents is the safety performance of 
an organization (Zohar, 2010)—organizations that have a positive safety climate 
experience fewer accidents and injuries than those with a negative safety climate (Allen, 
Barren, & Scott, 2010).  The intent of this research was to determine why operators 
would or would not report safety concerns. 
The research was formed from two basic research questions:  
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 Research Question 1: Which of the four identified factors influence operator’s 
intentions on submitting ASAP reports?  
 Research Question 2: How do the four identified factors affect operator’s 
intentions submitting ASAP reports? 
The above research questions, along with reviewed literature, led the research to 
test six potential relationships written as hypotheses.  Three important surveys questions, 
which did not pertain necessarily to the model but were considered valuable knowledge 
by AMC, included knowledge about the program itself (questions 1, 2, and 29).  
Histogram 1 favored very positively that 97.3% of AMC operators are familiar with 
ASAP; however, only 81% of the operators were able to positively claim they knew how 
to actually report a safety concern.  Only 36% were aware about a signed commander’s 
policy.  This indicates that a majority of the operators have heard of the program and are 
aware of safety reporting options.  The relatively high reporting procedures indicates 
communication about how to report safety concerns was strong, but additional training 
can provide stopgaps.  The low number of awareness of a commander’s letter could 
potentially indicate a communication problem, lack of association, or another factor 
which would need to be further researched.  
Hypothesis #1 stated: Perceived repercussion is positively related to operators 
submitting ASAP reports.  With regard to repercussion, operators provided mixed 
reviews with trust in the organization.  Currently, individuals find themselves in 
situations where they feel there are two outcomes to a mistake: report the mistakes and 
risk reprimand, or hide the mistake and hope the entire crew remains silent.  This 
mentality must end; it is imperative for individuals to report safety concerns (Dekker, 
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2012).  Just culture is an atmosphere where front-line operators are not punished for 
actions, omissions, or decisions made commensurate with experience and training, and 
where gross negligence, willful disregard, and destructive acts are not tolerated (Oliber, 
2015).  The model did not indicate repercussion directly influenced whether an operator 
reported a safety concern.  However, only 36% of operators were aware of a signed 
commander’s letter, a letter that outlines the trust in the program and a promise against 
retribution by high-level leaders.  Eighty-one percent of the operators did not feel they 
would be punished for their ASAP reports—a strong sentiment for the program; yet only 
51% of the responders indicated they felt their identity was truly protected.  There is still 
speculation that crewmembers have been disqualified or punished because of previously 
reported events, and only 48% of the responses indicated they could actually trust their 
commanders if reports were made.  A significantly higher response (74%) indicated 
positive trust in the higher headquarters to protect identities existed; yet only 54% of the 
responses indicated they felt ASAP would not be used negatively against them.  Only 
30% indicated they were comfortable providing a name with their report.  The data, along 
with the rejected hypothesis in the model, suggests operators are not discouraged entirely 
from reporting due to repercussion; however, they may not trust the system or provide 
contact information for follow-up questions or clarification.  
Hypotheses #2 stated: Inconvenience is positively related to operators submitting 
ASAP reports.  With regard to inconvenience, the model indicated inconvenience did not 
directly influence whether an operator reported safety concerns or not.  Gilbey, Tani, and 
Tsui (2015) hypothesized one possible explanation for a lack of safety reporting was the 
inconvenience of completing the actual report itself.  Specifically, Gilbey et al. (2015) 
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discussed the disadvantage of not being able to immediately report a situation due to 
other priorities, time for completion of the report, or simple memory loss of the event.  
Only 54.2% of the operators responded positively that the process was convenient, while 
similar numbers indicated operators felt ASAP took too long to complete the process.  
Only 21.7% indicated positively that ASAP was a priority as part of post-mission duties.  
However, despite the relatively poor numbers, the model does not suggest that the 
program is so inconvenient that it would prevent an operator from reporting a safety 
concern.  
Hypothesis #3 stated: The significance of an event is positively related to 
operators submitting ASAP reports.  Significance of event provided drastic results and 
indicated the size of the event made a difference in whether a report was made or not.  In 
a study conducted by Gilbey, Tani, and Tsui, “bad outcomes were judged as more likely 
to be reported than identical acts with innocuous outcomes” (2015, p. 141).  Gilbey et al. 
(2015) suggested if there was no publicity about an event, it could be assumed that the 
outcome of the concern was innocuous, and therefore, the concern was probably 
groundless.  If the individual perceives an event as innocuous, high potential exists for 
under-reporting.  The model indicated significance of event directly affected if an 
operator reported safety concerns.  Only 24% indicated they would report a small event, 
while 85% indicated they would report a large event.  Being at fault did not appear to 
have a significant impact on reporting—operators generally chose to report safety 
concerns if safety of flight was compromised, regardless of pilot fault.  These results 
directly indicate operators are not reporting safety concerns if the event is not deemed to 
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be a significant event in their mind, regardless of the potential ramifications of future 
operations.  
Hypothesis #4 stated: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively 
related to operators submitting ASAP reports.  Program value had mixed responses but 
was determined to directly affect if an operator reported safety concerns.  Gilbey, Tani, 
and Tsui (2015) suggested a lack of priority toward safety could contribute to an under-
reported safety program.  If no incident investigation or corrective actions were expected 
from reported accidents, employees could feel it was pointless to bring forward 
information (Probst & Estrada, 2010).  In the study, ninety-one percent of the operators 
positively felt ASAP had value, yet only 67% believe policies have been changed 
because of responses.  Eighty-four percent of the operators still felt it was worth their 
time to use ASAP, and 70% felt the reports had actually been used to change procedures.  
Interestingly, only 65% of the operators felt ASAP reports that were communicated 
changed the way they performed their job.  Overall, 84% felt ASAP was good for 
improving safety.  The responses indicate operators see value in having the program and 
can factor-in whether operators report their concerns or not.   
Hypothesis #5 stated: The perceived value of the ASAP program is positively 
related to significance of event while hypothesis #6 stated: The perceived value of the 
ASAP program is positively related to inconvenience.  The factor program value was 
statistically determined to directly influence whether a safety concern should be reported; 
answers from the surveys indicated an overwhelming support for ASAP existed.  
According to Gilbey et al. (2015), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
claims the accurate and timely reporting of relevant information related to hazards 
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reported by front-line personnel is one of the best sources of data.  Essentially, the 
hypotheses were positively confirmed that program value positively influences the 
factors significance of event and inconvenience.  According to the model, significance of 
event, and perceived value are factors that directly influence whether an operator reports 
safety concerns.  
Conclusions 
Recent military crashes have highlighted a need for an advanced safety program.  
It is not acceptable in the modern Air Force or aviation industry to simply wait for 
mishaps to occur in order to find preventable measures.  Proactive safety is a real and 
necessary commodity which has the ability to prevent mishaps and save lives, and starts 
with a positive safety culture.  
The Aviation Safety Action Program is one of the most direct, front-line methods 
operators and management have available to gather valid safety information.  According 
to Zohar (2010), meta-analytic data suggests safety climate perceptions predict safety 
behaviors.  With a positive safety climate, trust permeates the organization, and the 
“existence of a healthy safety culture is a necessary attribute of the fully developed SMS” 
(Stolzer, Halford, & Goglia, 2008, p. 270).  However, a significant under-reporting of 
safety concerns exists throughout multiple industries (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015).  The 
effectiveness of a proactive safety program rests with the assumption that a free-flow 
information channel exists and is used judiciously to make aware of incidents, accidents, 
unsafe behaviors, and simple concerns (Gilbey, Tani, & Tsui, 2015).  It is believed 
significant amounts of under-reporting exists in AMC. 
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 Theoretical Contributions.  The results of this study truly indicate operators 
appreciate and recognize the importance of a preventative safety program.  However, 
there are still reporting issues to consider.  An operator who does not feel safe in leaving 
contact information prevents the ability for safety individuals to ask additional questions 
or clarify an event.  The model indicated that the factor repercussion did not directly 
affect if an operator reported a safety concern.  However, it is unknown if the operators 
already feel completely safe with reporting, or if the operator would feel comfortable IF 
there were no repercussion considerations.  While this dissertation failed to prove 
perceived repercussion positively contributed to operators reporting safety concerns, 
descriptive statistics proved operators are still fearful of management and lack basic trust 
in higher officials.  
With information from this research, OpsRAMS potentially has the ability to 
increase their safety reporting numbers.  With additional safety information being 
provided directly from operators, it is possible for fewer aviation incidents to occur—
literature indicates a strong safety culture has been demonstrated to help reduce mishaps, 
and a strong safety culture is concurrent with the free-flowing information of all aspects 
of the operation (Probst, 2008).  It is impossible for management to have knowledge on 
all aspects of the operations.  However, it is theorized that with additional safety reports 
concerning small situations, upper-level management will have the tools and capabilities 
to implement change as required to mitigate newly discovered hazards.  
One of the biggest hurdles for the Air Force to problem-solve will be changing a 
culture of operators fearing retribution.  A commitment to “safety and establishing a 
positive [safety culture] as the starting point toward achieving a sustainable business can 
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yield great benefits not only in terms of improved safety performance, but also with 
regards to improvements in a firm’s environmental and financial outcomes” 
(Hajmohammad & Vachon, 2014, p. 274).  In a recent ASAP, a crew member discussed 
self-induced throttle binding on a mission but failed to provide contact information.  By 
not providing the information, it was difficult for safety professionals to understand the 
background culture of why the self-induced situation had occurred.  Hajmohammad and 
Vachon (2014) suggest organizations with a positive [safety culture] are more likely to 
gain better financial, environmental, and safety outcomes as a result of their increased 
employees’ commitment in pursuing organization goals and objectives.  
 Practical Implications.   The data indicate ASAP can be more slightly 
convenient.  At the time of this writing, but after the surveys were completed, Air Force 
safety officials had already recognized a convenience problem existed and began to 
implement smart-phone and tablet applications to combat against the inconvenience of 
the process.  However, it is inaccurate to claim that a more utilized and convenient ASAP 
system prevented a specific amount of aircraft mishaps.  For example: as OpsRAMS 
makes ASAP even more convenient to use, it is unknown if the convenience factor will 
be the reason for increased reports.  Second, a safety institution cannot claim a specific 
set of mishaps were prevented in the future because of a written safety report.  When 
MFOQA discovered a hazard at Moses Lake with C-17s turning early, the procedures 
were adjusted to prevent a potential mishap.  However, there is nothing to say a mishap 
ever would have occurred if the procedures had not been changed in the first place.  
 The same theory should be recognized by OpsRAMS with the knowledge of this 
research.  If changes are made to produce more safety reports, OpsRAMS will have 
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increased knowledge to act upon specific safety concerns as required.  However, the 
increased reports cannot specifically be accredited to an aviation mishap that could or 
could not have happened in the future.  
 Limitations.  It was concluded that the majority of the Air Force’s focus should 
include promoting the value of the safety system, while educating the need to report all 
magnitude of events.  Probst (2008) confirmed two hypotheses during research: that 
organizational safety climate is related to the rate of experienced employee injuries, such 
that a more positive climate is related to a lower injury rate; and that organizations with a 
poor safety climate underreport injuries to a greater extent than organizations with a 
positive safety climate.  It is assumed that not all safety concerns will be reported, and not 
all members of the organization will embrace and trust the organization.  It will be nearly 
impossible to truly convince every member that punitive actions will not be taken for 
self-reported safety concerns.  Probst (2008) discovered in research that the existence of 
underreporting itself was not a new finding, but that a poor safety climate might be linked 
to underreporting.  However, with even slightly more safety reports and slight increases 
in trust, the organization can slowly shift toward a true just culture and a considerably 
safer operation, demonstrating a positive climb in safety culture.  
 It is difficult to rate exactly what is considered significant or insignificant.  The 
research suggests one of the most influential factors of this research is the significance of 
an event.  However, this research never specified what is to be considered a major event 
or not, and simply left it to the participants to decide.  While it is relatively easy to 
assume what is considered a major event and a very minor event, the line separating the 
two distinctions was never defined, and could have impacted the outcome of the study.  
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 It should be noted that the sample surveyed included mostly Active Duty mobility 
pilots.  The data unfortunately cannot accurately speak to the opinions or thoughts of the 
Guard or Reserves due to lack of sufficient data points.  Last, the study only considered 
four major factors.  It could be argued that other factors play a significant role in 
determining reasons for report submissions, or influence the factors mentioned in this 
dissertation.  This dissertation considered a hypothetical model suggested by the 
researcher and was based on literature review and conversations with OpsRAMS.  Other 
factors were not considered in that model and could have played a role in determining 
reporting safety concerns.  In addition, with the suggestion of a potentially new model by 
AMOS, other factors could potentially affect the model in other ways previously 
unaccounted for.  
Recommendations 
 It is important for AMC to attack two primary problems with ASAP in the 
mindset of the operator: program value and significance of event.  The data suggested 
operators loosely believed in the safety system (program value)—the hypothesis was 
supported that operators who had a positive belief in the program were more likely to 
report concerns; however, the data also indicated a majority of the sample did not believe 
in the program itself.  
OpsRAMS already worked to make the program more convenient to use after 
previous surveys were conducted, and the data suggested that inconvenience was not a 
major factor in reporting concerns.  There are no recommendations for this factor.  
 A strong safety climate leads to an increase in safety performance (Zohar, 2010).  
The model did not specifically prove repercussion directly influences safety concerns, 
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but further research may link repercussion  with program value.  However, looking at 
many of the individual questions, underlying trust issues still exist in the organization.  It 
is unknown at this time exactly why AMC operators do not trust the safety program.  
Trust issues could reside within the program, a management section, or the entire 
organization.  The FAA allowed for the ability for civil airmen to receive immunity (with 
discretion) for reporting safety concerns—the military offered no such allowance.  
Discovering why AMC operators do not trust the program will significantly help toward 
acceptance and use of the process and hopefully produce more safety reports and is an 
excellent topic for future research.  On the surface, it would appear there is simply not 
enough trust in the commanders or reporting process when operators commit mistakes.  
However, research also indicates if safety-of-flight was at risk, operators would still 
report the concern.  It is recommended for AMC to reinforce safety culture to both the 
commanders and operators.  If a commander punishes, not in accordance with the Major 
Command’s intent, the entire system is in jeopardy of being undermined.  
It is also important to emphasize the need to report all magnitudes of safety 
events.  The data suggests operators will report events when they believe the situation is 
significant and will not report if they feel the event is insignificant.  Many safety issues 
can actually be rather insignificant in nature but become a leading cause of catastrophic 
failure.  Emphasizing the need to report all levels of safety concern will likely increase 
the amount of safety reports being generated.  
Future Research  
 This research was limited in scope due to governmental red tape.  It is proposed to 
conduct a similar study across the entire AMC command, if not the entire Air Force, by 
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using this research as a platform for helping the U.S. Air Force understand the need for 
such research.  In doing so, consideration should be taken for a new proposed model that 
links the four factors differently than what was conducted with this research.  The U.S. 
Safety Center has recently re-named ASAP (Dec 2018) as the Airmen Safety Action 
Program, not simply an aviation entity.  In doing so, the Air Force is attempting to 
implement proactive safety across the entire organization.  The benefits to opening 
preventative safety to the entire command allow for multi-facet problems to be fixed 
prior to an incident.  With the ASAP reporting capabilities lying in the hands of all 
airmen, small safety concerns can be accounted-for prior to significant mishaps.  Future 
research is needed to examine if the changes currently being made to the program are 
affecting operators’ willingness to report concerns.  It is necessary to target the entire 
population, (recommended) using a web-based medium, to capture more significant data 
to best utilize and advertise the program.  
In addition, research regarding ASAP reports correcting safety concerns should be 
studied.  At the current time, no research indicates if providing feedback to the operators 
of their safety concerns has any merit to believe in the program or willingness to repeat 
the process.  OpsRAMS needs to acknowledge safety concerns.  Underreporting can be 
accredited to lack of acknowledgement—an employee may be hesitant to provide new 
information if a previous report was submitted without any feedback (Frazer, 2013).  The 
ASAP scoreboard currently tracks all ASAP submissions with results and 
recommendations on the website (https://afsas.safety.af.mil).  However, direct 
communication is often not established.  This situation leads individuals to believe 
management does not care about safety.  Other times, employees may simply believe the 
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program is ineffective due to scale, managerial concerns, budget, or other constraints 
(Frazer, 2013), thus the program having no value.  
As of publication, there is currently no military data to suggest that if an 
individual submits a report, but either never hears back about the concern or that the 
concern is not ratified, whether the same individual continues to use the system.  
Research, specifically targeting ASAP feedback, can improve management’s perspective 
about how people are using the program and what differences management needs to take 
to ensure people continue to report safety concerns.  
Last, this study uncovered the fact that many operators simply do not trust the 
program.  Employees may perceive reporting their own errors as risky, which may 
increase their reluctance to report (Zhao & Olivera, 2006).  It is unknown at this time 
exactly where the distrust lies, as the research indicates many levels of distrust lie within 
multiple levels of management, headquarters, Safety, etc.  A future research topic 
specifically targeting repercussion against self-incrimination could uncover significant 
amounts of data.  
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APPENDIX A  
 
ASAP Survey 
 
Under-reporting in the Military Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) 
The purpose of this survey is to measure the factors that affect an operators’ intentions to 
use the Military Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP). This survey should take less 
than 3 minutes. There are no right or wrong answers; however, we ask that you 
participate and respond in an honest and conscientious way. Your responses are 
completely anonymous and you will not be connected to your responses in any manner.  
 
What is your current status?  (Circle One):         AD       Guard      Reserve   
 
What is your current MWS? _____________________________________________ 
 
What is your current base location? _______________________________________ 
 
Please circle your answer.  
 
 
1. I am familiar with ASAP. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
2. I know how to submit an ASAP report. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree 
3. ASAP is convenient to use.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
4. Submitting an ASAP report does not take much of my time. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
5. After a sortie, ASAP is a priorty as part of post-mission duties.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
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6. I can be Q3’d based solely on an ASAP report. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
7. ASAP reports are truly identity protected.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
8. I believe crewmembers have been Q3’d based on their ASAP reports.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
9. Commanders can be trusted if I self-report.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
10. Those who process / analyze ASAP reports can be trusted to protect my 
identity. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
11. ASAP information can be used negatively against me.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
12. I fear ASAP information will be used to punish my unintentional errors.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
13. I am likely to submit an ASAP report for a small deviation.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
14. I am likely to submit an ASAP report for a major deviation.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
15. I am likely to submit an ASAP if I was clearly wrong.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
 
16. I am likely to submit an ASAP if safety of flight was compromised, but I was not 
at fault.  
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Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
17. I am likely to submit an ASAP if safety of flight was compromised, and I AM at 
fault.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
18. I am likely to submit a report if I feel the event was significant.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
19. I would NOT submit a report if I feel the event was minor.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
20. I can escape punishment / a potential Q3 if I submit an ASAP.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
21. I see value in the ASAP program.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
22. I believe policies have been changed because of ASAP reports.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
23. I am likely to include my name/contact info for follow-up questions in an ASAP 
report. 
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
24. ASAP is a great way to communicate safety concerns with senior-leadership.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
 
25. It is worth my time to submit an ASAP report.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
26. Information gatherd by ASAP is actually used to change procedures / policies.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
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27. Communicated ASAP reports change how I perform my job.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
28. ASAP is generally effective in improving safety.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
29. I am aware of the AMC/CC signed ASAP policy letter.  
Strongly Agree    Agree     Neither agree or disagree     Disagree       Strongly disagree  
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APPENDIX B 
 
Agreement to Participate  
 
Survey of ASAP IN THE USAF: MOBILITY AIRCREWS’ INTENTIONS TO USE 
SAFETY REPORTING 
 
STUDY LEADERSHIP. I am asking you to take part in a research project that is led by 
Travis Whittemore, graduate student, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University.  
 
PURPOSE. The purpose of this study is to ascertain the value certain factors have on 
AMC aircrews’ intentions to provide ASAP reports.  
 
ELIGIBILITY. To be in this study, you must be 18 years or older and a resident of the 
United States. 
 
PARTICIPATION. During this study, you will be asked to complete a brief survey using 
pen and paper regarding your perceptions about AMC safety reports. The completion of 
the survey will take approximately 5 minutes.  
 
RISKS OF PARTICIPATION. The risk of participating in the study are minimal, no 
more than everyday life.  
 
BENEFITS OF PARTICIPATION. Your answers will be compiled and analyzed for 
senior leadership. Your participation may influence changes in policy and safety 
promotion.  
 
COMPENSATION. There is no compensation offered for taking part in this study.  
 
VOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION. Your participation in this study is completely 
voluntary. You may stop or withdraw from the study at any time or refuse to answer any 
particular question without it be held against you. If you choose to ‘opt-out’ during the 
research process, no data collected will be used in the study. Your decision whether or 
not to participate will have no effect on your current or future connection with anyone at 
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University or the United States Air Force.  
 
RESPONDENT PRIVACY. Your individual information will be protected in all data 
resulting from this study. Your responses to this survey will be anonymous. No personal 
information will be collected other than basic demographic descriptors. No one other than 
the researcher and survey administrator will have access to any of the responses.  
 
FURTHER INFORMATION. If you have any questions or would like additional 
information about this study, please contact Travis Whittemore, whittemt@erau.eud or 
the faculty member overseeing this project, Dr. Mark Friend, frien9b8@erau.edu.  
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The ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) has approved this project. You may contact 
the ERAU IRB with any questions or issues at 386-226-7179 or teri.gabriel@erau.edu. 
ERAU’s IRB is registered with the Department of Health & Human Services – Number – 
IORG0004370.  
 
CONSENT. By participating in this survey, you certify that: you are 18 years or older, a 
resident of the U.S., understand the information on this form, that someone has answered 
any and all questions you may have about this study, and you voluntarily agree to 
participate in the study.  
 
If you do not wish to participate in the study, simply do not fill out the survey.  
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APPENDIX C 
 
Steckel ASAP Survey 
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APPENDIX E 
 
SME Biographies 
 
COLONEL TIMOTHY G. GROSZ (Retired) 
 
Tim Grosz is the Chief, Operations Risk Assessment and Management System (Ops RAMS) Branch. It 
establishes processes to collect multi-source data and identify trends in order to mitigate risk in all mobility 
activities and make cross-functional adjustments to policy and training.  It uses trend data from various 
sources including, but not limited to, Military Flight Operations Quality Assurance (MFOQA), Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP), Standardization and Evaluation flight evaluation data, simulator 
performance data, Aircrew Standardization and Evaluation  Visits (ASEVs), Staff Assistance Visits 
(SAVs), Line Operations Safety Audits (LOSA) reports, Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP) 
reports, aircrew surveys, Aviation Operational Risk Management (AvORM), Safety investigations and 
analysis, and other forums providing information and trends concerning Mobility Air Forces (MAF) 
operations. 
 
Colonel Grosz is a graduate of Northbrook Sr. High School, Houston, TX.  He earned a Bachelor of 
Science degree in Operations Research in 1981 from the U.S. Air Force Academy and a Master of Arts 
degree in Aerospace/Aviation Management in 1993 from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. 
 
Colonel Grosz was commissioned as a second lieutenant in May 1981 and is a command pilot with over 
4000 hours in the T-38, C-141B and C-5.  He retired from the Air Force 1 June 2011. 
 
EDUCATION 
1981 Bachelor of Science Degree in Operations Research, U.S. Air Force Academy, Colo. 
1986 Squadron Officer School (correspondence) 
1986 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 
1992 Air Command and Staff College (correspondence) 
1993 Master of Arts Degree, Aerospace/Aviation Management, Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University 
1997 Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 
 
ASSIGNMENTS 
1. July 1981 – June 1982, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Laughlin Air Force Base, Tex. 
2. November 1982 – March 1985, Instructor Pilot, Laughlin Air Force Base, Tex. 
3. April 1985 – May 1987, Detachment Operations Officer, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. 
4. May 1987 – July 1988, Detachment Commander, Offutt Air Force Base, Neb. 
5. July 1988 – July 1990, Aide-De-Camp ATC Commander, Randolph Air Force Base, Tex. 
6. September 1990 – April 1993, Chief Pilot C-141B, Instructor Pilot, McChord Air Force Base, Wash. 
7. April 1993 – September 1994, Aide-De-Camp USAFE/AIRCENT Commander, Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany 
8. September 1994 – June 1996, Chief Plans & Military Cooperation, HQ AFELM NATO/AIRCENT, 
Ramstein Air Base, Germany 
9. July 1996 – June 1997, Student Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala. 
10. September 1997 – July 1998, Commander 62d Operations Support Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, 
Wash. 
11. July 1998 – April 2000, Commander 8th Airlift Squadron, McChord Air Force Base, Wash. 
12. May 2000 – June 2002, Military Assistant to the Executive Secretary of Department of Defense, Pentagon 
13. July 2002 - June 2003, Deputy Commander, 721st Air Mobility Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany 
14. June 2003 - April 2005, Commander, 721st Air Mobility Operations Group, Ramstein Air Base, Germany 
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15. April 2005 – December 2006, Commander, 615th Contingency Response Wing, Travis Air Force Base, 
Calif. 
16. 
 
17. 
December 2006 – May 2011, Assistant Director, Air, Space, and Information Operations, Headquarters Air 
Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. 
July 2012 – Present, Chief, Operations Risk Assessment and Management System, Headquarters Air 
Mobility Command, Scott Air Force Base, Ill. 
 
 
FLIGHT INFORMATION 
Rating: Command Pilot 
Flight Hours: More than 4000 
Aircraft T-38, C-141B, C-5 
 
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 
Defense Superior Service Medal 
Legion of Merit with two oak leaf clusters 
Defense Meritorious Service Medal 
Meritorious Service Medal with three oak leaf clusters 
Aerial Achievement Medal  
Air Force Commendation Medal 
 
 
 
LT COLONEL JAMES R. BROWNING 
Lt Col James R. Browning is the Chief of Safety for the 47th Flying Training Wing, Laughlin AFB, Texas.  
He is the principle safety advisor to the Wing Commander and is responsible for directing and 
implementing the Wing-level flight, explosives and occupational safety programs.  Lt Col Browning also 
leads base mishap prevention, Bird Aircraft Strike Hazard reductions, annual/spot safety inspection 
programs and all formal safety investigation reports ensuring the safety of 5,400 total base community 
personnel and spanning over $1.4 billion in base property assets and $1.1 billion in aircraft assets. 
Lt Col Browning was commissioned through the Air Force Officer Training School at Maxwell Air Force Base, 
Alabama in 2001 and earned his pilot wings at Columbus Air Force Base, Mississippi in 2003. As an airlift 
aviator he has held various positions at the squadron, group and wing levels operating the C-5 and C-40 
in missions all over the globe including support for operations ENDURING FREEDOM, IRAQI 
FREEDOM, NEW DAWN and ODYSSEY DAWN. 
 
In his previous assignment Lt Col Browning was Chief, Standardization and Evaluation for the 436th 
Operations Group, Dover Air Force Base, Delaware. 
 
EDUCATION     1999 Bachelor of Science, Electrical Engineering Technology, Texas A&M University, College Station 
    2006 Master of Business and Administration, Touro University International, Cypress, Cal. 
    2006 Squadron Officer School, Maxwell AFB, Ala. 
    2010 Air Command and Staff College, by correspondence 
    2016 Air War College, by correspondence 
 
ASSIGNMENTS 
1. July 2001 – February 2003, Student, Undergraduate Pilot Training, Columbus AFB, Miss. 
2. March 2003 – May 2003, Student, C-5 Co-Pilot Initial Qualification Training, Altus AFB, Okla. 
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3. June 2003 – April 2005, C-5A/B Pilot; Stan/Eval Liaison, 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del. 
4. May 2005 – September 2006, C-5A/B Aircraft Commander; Chief of Awards and Decorations; 
Mission Scheduler, 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del. 
5. October 2006 – June 2007, C-5A/B Instructor Aircraft Commander; Chief, Squadron Executive Officer,     
9 AS, Dover AFB, Del. 
6. July 2007 – February 2009, C-40C Aircraft Commander; Chief, Training; Squadron Executive Officer,   
54 AS, Scott AFB, Ill. 
7. March 2009 – July 2009, C-40C Instructor Aircraft Commander; Assistant Director of 
Operations; Operations Flight Commander, 54 AS, Scott AFB, Ill. 
8. August 2009 – July 2010, Chief of Wing Flying Safety, 375 AMW, Scott AFB, Ill. 
9. August 2010 – February 2011, C-5M Aircraft Commander; Training Officer 9 AS, Dover AFB, Del.   
10. March 2011 – August 2011, C-5M Evaluator Aircraft Commander; Chief Squadron Stan/Eval, 9 AS, 
Dover AFB, Del. 
11. September 2011 – September 2013, C-5M Evaluator Aircraft Commander; Chief, Operations Group 
Stan/Eval, 436th Operation Group, Dover AFB, Del. 
12. October 2013 – February 2014, Student, T-6A Pilot Instructor Training, Randolph AFB, Texas 
13. March 2014 – July 2015, T-6 Instructor Pilot;  Assistant Director of Operations, 47 OSS, Laughlin 
AFB, Texas 
14. August 2015 – February 2016, Director of Staff, 47 OG, Laughlin AFB, Texas 
15. March 2016 – March 2017, Director of Operations, 47 OSS, Laughlin AFB, Texas 
16. April 2017 – Present, Chief of Safety and T-6 IP, 47 FTW, Laughlin AFB, Texas 
 
FLIGHT INFORMATION 
  Rating: Senior Pilot 
  Flight Hours: 4,600 including more than 1,100 combat hours 
  Aircraft C-5A/B/M, C-40C, T-37, T-1 and T-6 
 
MAJOR AWARDS AND DECORATIONS 
  Meritorious Service Medal 
  Air Medal with two oak leaf clusters 
  Aerial Achievement Medal with two oak leaf clusters 
  Air Force Commendation Medal with one oak leaf cluster 
 
 
 
 
LT COLONEL LUKE J. SCHNEIDER 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was commissioned an officer in the US Air Force in May 2000 as a 
graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. He completed Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training 
in 2001 at Vance Air Force Base as a Distinguished Graduate and AETC Commander’s Trophy recipient. 
Following pilot training, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to the 494th Fighter Squadron, RAF 
Lakenheath, UK where he served as the assistant Chief of Scheduling and F-15E Flight Lead supporting 
Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom. In 2006, he was assigned to the 25th Flying 
Training Squadron at Vance AFB, OK where he served as a Flight Commander and T-38C 
Instructor/Evaluator pilot. In 2009, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to Seymour Johnson AFB, 
NC where he upgraded to F-15E Instructor Pilot while serving in the 4th Operational Support Squadron as 
the Aircrew Flight Equipment Flight Commander then as an Assistant Director of Operations in the 336th 
Fighter Squadron. While there, he deployed in support of Operation Enduring Freedom and Iron Falcon. 
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider attended Air Command and Staff College in 2012, and upon graduation was 
assigned to Headquarters Air Force, A10 where he served as the Action Group Chief for Strategic 
Deterrence, Nuclear Integration directorate. In 2015, Lieutenant Colonel Schneider was assigned to RAF 
Lakenheath, UK where he was an F-15E Flight Lead and served as the Chief of Wing Plans.  
 
131 
 
 
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider holds a Bachelor of Science in Behavioral Science Engineering 
from the United States Air Force Academy. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air 
Command and Staff College.  He holds a Master of Science Degree in Aeronautical Science from Embry-
Riddle Aeronautical University and a Master of Military Operational Art and Science.  
 
Lieutenant Colonel Schneider is a Command Pilot with over 2,800 hours of flight time primarily 
in the F-15E and T-38C.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
